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This updated question-and-answer document is specific to
impartial hearing officers (IHOs) and the hearings that they conduct
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1 The
coverage does not extend to the alternate third-party dispute
decisional mechanism under the IDEA, the complaint resolution
process (CRP) except to the extent that this alternative mechanism
intersects with IHO issues.2
Similarly, the scope only extends
secondarily to the IHO’s remedial authority, which is the subject of
separate comprehensive coverage.3 The sources are largely limited to
the pertinent IDEA legislation and regulations, court decisions, and
the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Special Education’s
(OSEP) policy letters.4 Thus, the answers are subject to revision or
*

Perry A. Zirkel is university professor emeritus of education and law at
Lehigh University. He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the
University of Connecticut, and an L.L.M. from Yale. Although remaining solely
responsible for the contents, the author expresses his appreciation to editor-in-chief
Yoori Chung for her diligent work in assuring the stylistic compliance of the article
with the applicable manuals.
1 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400.1 et seq.
(2017). For the IDEA regulations, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. Office of Special
Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) Assistance to States for the
Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 (2018).
2 For a legal overview of CRP, see Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the
IDEA Complaint Resolution Process: An Update, 313 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2015). For
a systematic comparison of the two mechanisms, see Perry A. Zirkel, A
Comparison of the IDEA’s Dispute Resolution Processes: Complaint Resolution
and Impartial Hearings, 326 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2016). For the primary features of
the state CRP systems, see Kristin Hansen & Perry A. Zirkel, Complaint Procedure
Systems under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 31 J. SPECIAL EDUC.
LEADERSHIP 108 (Sept. 2018).
3 Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Latest Update, 37 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 505 (2018); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition
and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A Decisional Checklist, 282 EDUC. L
REP. 785 (2012); Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: The Next Annotated
Update of the Law, 336 EDUC. L. REP. 654 (2016).
4 OSEP is the specific organizational unit within the U.S. Department of
Education that administers the IDEA. Although OSEP policy letters do not have
the binding effect on IHOs of either the IDEA or, within their jurisdictions, court
decisions, they provide a nationally applicable interpretation that courts often find
persuasive. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Courts’ Use of OSEP Policy
Interpretations in IDEA Cases, 344 EDUC. L. REP. 671 (2017). But cf. Seth B. v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Dist., 810 F.3d 961, 968 (5th Cir. 2015) (relying on the
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qualification based on (1) applicable state laws;5 (2) additional legal
sources beyond those cited; and (3) independent interpretation of the
cited and additional pertinent legal sources. The author welcomes
corrections and additions from interested parties so that the document
is as accurate, comprehensive, and current as possible.
Intended primarily for IHOs but ultimately for any interested
individuals, the items are organized into various subject categories
within two successive broad groups. For the specific organization,
see the Table of Contents on the previous page.
I. HEARING OFFICER ISSUES
A. IHO Qualifications
1. Does the IDEA provide any standards for IHO competence?
Yes, the 2004 amendments provided, for the first time,
competence standards, which are broadly focused on knowing special
education law, conducting hearings, and writing decisions.6
Specifically, the IDEA competency standards require IHOs to:
(1) possess knowledge of, and the ability to
understand, the provisions of [the IDEA], Federal and
State regulations pertaining to [the IDEA], and legal
interpretations of [the IDEA] by Federal and State
courts; (2) possess the knowledge and ability to
conduct hearings in accordance with appropriate,
standard legal practice; and (3) possess the knowledge
and ability to render and write decisions in accordance
with appropriate, standard legal practice.7

relevant regulation rather than the “questionable” OSEP interpretation). The
citations for policy letters herein include the parallel ed.gov URLs when available
for improved accessibility to the reader.
5 For a systematic overview, see Perry A. Zirkel, State Laws for Due Process
Hearings Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 38 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 3 (2018).
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A).
7 Id. In the few pertinent cases prior to these statutory standards, the courts
rejected challenges to IHO competency because they were not beyond the scope of
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2. Similarly, does the IDEA provide specific training requirements
for IHOs that are enforceable in individual cases?
No, training requirements are a matter of state law.8 Thus far, the
courts have not interpreted these state law provisions as incorporated
in the IDEA.9
3. What about the IDEA’s impartiality requirements?
In contrast to competence and training, IHO impartiality has been
the subject of extensive litigation. Courts have been notably
deferential, providing wide latitude to IHOs and generally not
requiring the appearance of impropriety standard that applies to
judges.10 The leading, but still not per se, exception for such
the IDEA. E.g., Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580 (D. Md. 2000);
Cavanagh v. Grasmick, 75 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (D. Md. 1999). After enactment
of this standard, the case law has been very limited and rather deferential. E.g.,
Bohn ex rel. Cook v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 8 (N.D. Iowa
2016).
8 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). In the
commentary accompanying the 2006 IDEA regulations, OSEP added that each
SEA’s general supervisory responsibility includes ensuring that its IHOs are
sufficiently trained to meet the three newly specified qualifications. Assistance to
States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for
Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,705 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). For state laws that specify training requirements for
IHOs, see Zirkel, supra note 5, at 17.
9 E.g., C.S. ex rel. Struble v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 63 (S.D. Cal.
2008); Adams v. Sch. Bd. of Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 38 IDELR
¶ 6 (D. Minn. 2002); Carnwath v. Grasmick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Carnwath v.
Bd. of Educ., 33 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434 (D. Md. 1998); cf. D.A. ex rel. Adams v.
Fairfield-Suisun Unified Sch. Dist., 58 IDELR ¶ 105 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (SEA is not
responsible in California for IHO training and competence); Canton Bd. of Educ. v.
N.B., 343 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. Conn. 2004) (lack of systemic violation). But
cf. C.E. v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 695 F. App’x 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2017)
(applying “grandfathered” state law criteria in upholding competence of IHO).
10 E.g., Peter Maher & Perry A. Zirkel, Impartiality of Hearing and Review
Officers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Checklist of Legal
Boundaries, 83 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 109, 120 n.62 (2007); Elaine Drager & Perry
A. Zirkel, Impartiality under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 86
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deference, is for ex parte communications.11 The overlapping issue
of recusal is largely a matter of state law,12 although an occasional
court decision has identified applicable criteria or procedures for
appellate review.13
4. Would a school district’s notification to the IHO that final
selection is contingent on the parent’s approval violate the IDEA?
Not according to OSEP’s interpretation, because the IDEA does
not provide parents with a veto right in the appointment of IHOs.14
However, this interpretation does not seem to take into careful
consideration that only a few state laws provide for party
participation in the selection process.15
B. IHO Immunity
5. Do IHOs have the same sweeping, absolute immunity that judges
have?
Yes, within the scope of their authority as IHOs.16
EDUC. L. REP. 11, 12–13 (1994). For state laws that provide additional IHO
impartiality requirements, including the higher standard, see Zirkel, supra note 5, at
17.
11 E.g., Hollenbeck v. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 658, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
But cf. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 93 v. John F. ex rel. James F., 33 IDELR ¶
210 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (based on proof of lack of actual bias, rejected ex parte
challenge).
12 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (within subcategories of IHO
qualifications and assignment and Party right to strike),
13 E.g., Falmouth Sch. Comm. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 106 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.
Mass. 2000).
14 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).
15 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 5, at 19–20. The approach in these few states is
more limited than mutual selection. E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/148.02a(f)(5) (2018) (permitting each party the right to one substitution in the
rotational assignment of the IHO).
16 E.g., Singletary v. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 848 F. Supp. 2d 588,
593 (E.D. N.C. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 502 F. App’x 340 (4th Cir. 2013);
Luo v. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d on
other grounds, 556 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2013); Oskowis v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., 72
IDELR ¶ 216 (D. Ariz. 2018); Henry ex rel. M.H. v. Lane, 69 IDELR ¶ 277 (W.D.
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II. HEARING/DECISION ISSUES
A. Resolution Sessions
6. Does the resolution process (in 34 C.F.R. § 300.510) apply when a
local education agency (LEA) files a due process complaint?
No, OSEP has explained that this process is not required in such
Rather, the forty-five-day period starts when the state
cases.17
education agency (SEA) and the parent receive the school district’s
complaint.18 According to OSEP, the parent’s right to a sufficiency
challenge and obligation to respond to the district’s complaint are the
same as for the district in the reverse situation.19 For cases in which
the parent raises a sufficiency challenge, OSEP added: “one way for
an LEA to amend a due process complaint that is not sufficient is for
the parent to agree in writing and be given an opportunity to resolve
the LEA's due process complaint through a resolution meeting.”20
7. Are the discussions in resolution sessions confidential?
According to OSEP’s interpretation, the only confidentiality
provisions that apply are the student records provisions in 34 C.F.R.
Pa. 2017); T.O. ex rel. Hayes v. Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 182
(E.D.N.C. 2017), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F. App’x. 640 (4th Cir. 2017); Luo v.
Owen J. Roberts Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016); B.J.S. v. State Educ.
Dep’t, 699 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (W.D.N.Y 2010); Stassart v. Lakeside Joint Sch.
Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 51 (N.D. Cal. 2009); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch.
Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 253 (E.D. Cal. 2008); DeMerchant v. Springfield Sch. Dist., 47
IDELR ¶ 94 (D. Vt. 2007); Weyrick v. New Albany-Floyd Cty. Consol. Sch. Corp.,
42 IDELR ¶ 169 (S.D. Ind. 2004); Sand v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 46 IDELR ¶ 161
(E.D. Wis. 2006); Walled Lake Consol. Sch. v. Doe, 42 IDELR ¶ 3 (E.D. Mich.
2004); cf. M.O. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851–54 (N.D. Ind.
2009) (IDEA review officers).
17 Dispute Resolution Procedures Under Part B of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 61 IDELR ¶ 232, at item D-2 (OSEP 2013) [hereinafter
Dispute Resolution Procedures], https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/
memosdcltrs/acccombinedosersdisputeresolutionqafinalmemo-7-23-13.pdf.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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§ 300.610 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA).21 Absent a voluntary agreement between the parties for
confidentiality, OSEP’s position is that either party may introduce
evidence of these discussions at the hearing.22 Although the
admissibility and the weight of such evidence remain within the
IHO’s discretion, the limited case law supports the OSEP
conclusion.23 Finally, although OSEP’s opinion is that “[a] State
could not . . . require that the participants in a resolution meeting
keep the discussions confidential,”24 some states have adopted laws
saying so.25
8. After filing for the hearing, may the parent unilaterally waive the
resolution session?
No. Like mediation, which must be voluntary for each party,26
waiving the resolution session must be mutual (and in writing).27
Moreover, the regulations require delay of the due process hearing if
the parent fails to participate in the resolution session in the absence
of such mutual agreement, and they also authorize the IHO to dismiss
the case upon the district’s motion if the parent’s refusal to

21

Id.

Letter
to
Cohen,
67
IDELR
¶
217
(OSEP
2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/15-004400r-il-cohendph-9-9-15.pdf; Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-17;
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool
Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,704 (Aug. 14, 2006)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Baglin, 53 IDELR ¶ 164
(OSEP 2008) (LEA may not require a parent to sign a confidentiality agreement as
a condition for having a resolution session, but the parties could agree to
confidentiality),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20084/baglin103008dueprocess4q2008.pdf.
23 E.g., Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. v. Smith, 561 F. Supp. 2d 74, 83
(D.D.C. 2008).
24 Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,704.
25 E.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-51-05(K)(9)(a)(3).
26 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.506(b)(1) (2018).
27 Id. § 300.532(c)(3); see also Spencer v. District of Columbia, 416 F. Supp.
2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2006).
22
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participate persists for the thirty-day period despite the district’s
documented reasonable efforts to obtain parental participation.28
9. Do difficulties communicating with the parents excuse a district’s
delay in conducting the resolution session within the required fifteenday period?
No, according to the federal district court in the District of Columbia,
at least if the parent has legal representation.29
10. After convening the resolution session, may the district refuse to
discuss the issues raised in a parent's due process complaint, instead
only offering to convene an IEP team meeting to address these
issues?
No, according to OSEP, this position would violate the IDEA.30
11. In a case where the parent filed for the hearing and either party
refused to participate in the resolution session, must the other party
seek the IHO’s intervention?
Yes, according to OSEP.31
12. Would a parent’s refusal to participate in the resolution session in
person justify an IHO’s dismissal of her due process complaint?
No, according to OSEP, without considering whether the parent had
valid reasons for refusing to physically attend the meeting.32 Indeed,
if the parent informs the district in advance of the meeting that
circumstances prevent attendance in person, the district must offer

34 C.F.R. §§ 300.510(b)(3)–(4).
Massey v. District of Columbia, 400 F. Supp. 2d 66, 72 (D.D.C. 2005).
30
Letter
to
Casey,
61
IDELR
¶
203
(OSEP
2013),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20131/casey03272013resolutionsession1q2013.pdf.
31 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-13.
32
Letter to Walker, 59 IDELR ¶ 262 (OSEP 2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/12006705resmtgs3q201
2.pdf.
28
29
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the parent alternative means of participation, such as telephone or
videoconferencing.33
13. Would a state law that permits postponement of the resolution
timeline when the SEA or LEA receives the parent’s due process
complaint shortly before or during an extended holiday break be
consistent with the IDEA?
No, not according to OSEP.34 The specified period is fifteen
calendar days,35 and the only exceptions are the alternate agreements
between the parent and the LEA either to waive the resolution
meeting or to utilize the mediation process.36
14. May the parties mutually agree to extend the fifteen-day
resolution period to resolve an expedited due process complaint?
No, according to OSEP. The agency based its conclusion that this
deadline was absolute on the lack of any such waiver authority in 34
C.F.R. § 300.532(c) and the overriding purpose of promptness in the
applicable disciplinary cases.37
15. If fifteen days after the parent’s filing for a due process hearing,
the school district fails to convene or participate in the resolution
session, what may the parents do to move the matter forward?

Letter
to
Savit,
64
IDELR
¶
250
(OSEP
2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/savit-dcps-policies1-119-2016.pdf.
34 Letter to Anderson, 110 LRP 70096 (OSEP Nov. 10, 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20104/anderson111010dph4q2010.pdf; see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra
note 17, at item D-10.
35 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b)
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) (2018).
36 See supra text accompanying notes 26–27.
37 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item E-4; see also Letter to
Gerl,
51
IDELR
¶
166
(OSEP
2008),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20082/gerl050108dueprocess2q2008.pdf.
33
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The parent may seek the IHO’s intervention to start the timeline for
the hearing.38 Additionally, a federal district court ruled that this
parental right is voluntary; thus, the parent’s choice not to exercise it
did not excuse the district’s failure.39
16. If, after the parent files for a hearing, the parties neither waive nor
hold the resolution session after thirty-one days, what happens on day
thirty-one?
According to OSEP, the forty-five-day timeline for conducting the
hearing and issuing a decision starts on day thirty-one.40
17. Does insufficiency of the complaint postpone the timeline or
negate the requirement for the resolution session?
Not according to OSEP. More specifically, the commentary
accompanying the regulations declared: “We agree with S. Rpt. No.
108–185, p. 38 [i.e., the IDEA’s legislative history], which states that

34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(5); see also Assistance to States for the Education of
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,702 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). For
varying judicial consequences, compare O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. District of Columbia,
573 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that LEA’s failure to convene a
resolution session constituted harmless error), with J.M.C. ex rel. E.G.C. v. La. Bd.
of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 584 F. Supp. 894, 896 (M.D. La. 2008) (ruling
that where LEA failed to convene the resolution session within fifteen days, the
settlement agreement before due process hearing was not enforceable).
39 Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. T.G. ex rel. Cheryl G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw.
2011).
40
Letter to Worthington, 51 IDELR ¶ 281 (OSEP 2008),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20081/worthington031708dph1q2008.pdf. However, mitigating this eventuality, OSEP
also stated that the SEA has the responsibility to enforce the LEA’s affirmative
obligation to convene the resolution meeting within fifteen days of receiving the
parent’s complaint. Id. Moreover, state regulations may contribute to the
conclusion that the failure to waive or hold the resolution session precludes holding
the impartial hearing. Colbert Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. B.R.T. ex rel. Cagle, 51 IDELR
¶ 16 (N.D. Ala. 2008).
38
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the resolution meeting should not be postponed when the LEA
believes that a parent’s complaint is insufficient.”41
18. Does a non-attorney parent advocate’s presence at the resolution
session trigger the district’s qualified right to attend with its attorney?
Not according to OSEP, even if the advocate is entitled under state
law to represent the parent/student at a due process hearing.42
19. What is the legal result if a parent fails or refuses to participate in
the resolution session upon the district’s timely attempt to schedule
the session within fifteen days?
According to OSEP, the district’s obligation is to “continue to make
diligent efforts throughout the remainder of the [thirty]-day
resolution period to convince the parent to participate in a resolution
meeting.” Examples of such efforts include “detailed records of
telephone calls made or attempted and the results of those calls and
copies of correspondence sent to the parents and any responses
received.” Moreover, at the conclusion of this thirty-day period, the
LEA “may request that a hearing officer dismiss the complaint when
the LEA is unable to obtain the participation of a parent in a
resolution meeting, despite making reasonable efforts to obtain the
parent's participation and documenting its efforts.”43
20. For violations of the resolution-session requirements, must the
other party seek the intervention of the IHO?
Yes, according to OSEP, “[t]he appropriate party must seek the
hearing officer's intervention to either dismiss the complaint or to
initiate the hearing timeline, depending on the circumstances.”44

Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,698.
42
Letter to Lawson, 55 IDELR ¶ 232 (OSEP 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20101/lawson020210dueprocess1q2010.pdf.
43 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item D-7.
44 Id. at item D-13.
41
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21. Does a district’s delay in conducting the resolution session
constitute a denial of the IDEA obligation to provide a free
appropriate public education (FAPE)?
Not necessarily.45
22. Must the district representative at the resolution session have
final and absolute authority to resolve the complaint?
Not quite, according to an unpublished decision. In rejecting the
superintendent and special education director in the circumstances of
this case, the court concluded that said representative “satisfies the
statutory requirement only if he or she, in fact, has the authority—by
express delegation or otherwise—to make the decision about what
the LEA will or will not do to resolve the issues presented in the
IDEA complaint.”46
23. Would the district’s violation of this requirement be the basis for
an IHO order based on denial of FAPE?
No, according to the same decision, without an evidentiary basis that
this procedural violation impeded the child’s substantive right to
FAPE.47
B. Sufficiency Process
24. Does the IDEA require the noncomplaining party to specify the
basis for its insufficiency motion?
No.48

E.g., J.D.G. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 748 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Del. 2010) (no
denial of FAPE where parents contributed to the delay and no harm to child).
46 J.Y. ex rel. E.Y. v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 63 IDELR ¶ 33 (M.D. Ala.
2014).
47 Id.
48 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d) (2018).
45
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25. What steps are available to the complaining party if an IHO rules
that the due process complaint is insufficient?
Citing the pertinent IDEA regulations and the comments
accompanying them, OSEP answered that 1) the IHO must identify
the specific insufficiencies in the notice; 2) the filing party may
amend its complaint if the other party provides written consent and
has an opportunity for mediation or a resolution session; 3) the IHO
may, if the filing party does not exercise this amendment option,
dismiss the insufficient complaint; and 4) the party may re-file if
within the two-year limitations period.49
26. If the filing party, with written consent from the other party,
amends its complaint, do the fifteen-day timeline for the resolution
meeting, the thirty-day resolution period and the party participation
requirement re-commence?
Yes, according to OSEP.50
27. Have courts been supportive of strict IHO interpretations of the
IDEA’s sufficiency requirements?
The limited case law to date leaves the answer to this question
unsettled. The Third Circuit upheld an IHO’s dismissal of a case
where the parent unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court’s
characterization in Schaffer v. Weast51 of the IDEA’s pleading
requirements as “minimal” allowed less than strict compliance with
all of the required elements of the complaint.52 Yet, in another
Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-4.
Id.
51 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
52 M.S.-G. v. Lenape Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 306 F. App’x 772 (3d
Cir. 2009); cf. D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 596 F. App’x 49 (3d
Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal for insufficiency based on IDEA pleading
standards, without specifying them); H.T. ex rel. V.T. v. Hopewell Valley Reg’l
Bd. of Educ., 66 IDELR ¶ 48 (D.N.J. 2015) (ruling that court lack jurisdiction but
upholding, based on abundance of caution due to not clearly settled issue, IHO’s
denial decision); Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. v. S.F. ex rel. Steven F., 50 IDELR ¶
104 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (ruling that IHO exceeded his authority by addressing claim
not properly raised in the hearing complaint).
49
50
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unpublished decision, the federal district court in New Hampshire
reversed an IHO’s dismissal for insufficiency, alternatively citing
with approval this dictum in Schaffer and the school district’s failure
to contest the matter within the prescribed fifteen-day window.53
Providing a third approach, the Eighth Circuit held, in an unpublished
decision, that the IDEA does not provide for judicial review of IHO
sufficiency decisions.54
28. Conversely, do courts favor a strict interpretation of the IDEA’s
requirements for the defendant’s response to the complaint?
No, to the extent that the federal district court in the District of
Columbia has ruled that a default judgment, i.e., dismissal with
prejudice, would generally not be—without affecting the student's
substantive rights—an appropriate sanction for failure to adhere to
requirement.55
C. Jurisdiction
29. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for violations of the prehearing,
including sufficiency, process?
Yes, at least for a district’s failure to send a prior written notice to the
parent regarding the subject matter of the parent’s due process
complaint and the failure to provide a response to the complaint
within the resulting required ten days.56
Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 93 (D.N.H.
2009); see also Escambia Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Benton, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (N.D.
Ala. 2005); Anello v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 104 (Del. Fam. Ct.
2007).
54 Knight ex rel. J.N.K. v. Wash. Sch. Dist., 416 F. App’x 594 (8th Cir. 2011);
see also G.R. ex rel. Russell v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2, 823 F. Supp. 1120, 1123
(D. Or. 2011). According to Knight, the proper resolution for the IHO is to dismiss
the case without, not with, prejudice. Knight, 416 F. App’x at 595.
55 Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia, 535 F. Supp. 2d 13, 19–20
(D.D.C. 2008); Sykes v. District of Columbia, 518 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266–67
(D.D.C. 2007).
56
Letter to Inzelbuch, 62 IDELR ¶ 122 (OSEP 2013),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20133/inzelbuch092413evaluation3q2013.pdf.
53
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30. Other than unilateral placement (i.e., tuition reimbursement)
cases, do IHOs have jurisdiction for the IDEA claims of a child who
resides in, but is not enrolled, in the school district?
The issue is not clearly settled. According to a federal district court
decision in the District of Columbia, the answer is yes.57 The court
based its conclusion on the language of the IDEA that triggers a
school district’s obligations, including Child Find, on residency, not
enrollment.58 Other courts have extended this answer even if the
child’s residency changes.59 OSEP agrees with this answer.60
However, the Eighth Circuit answered the question no at least under
a Minnesota law that requires the impartial hearing to be “‘conducted
by and in the school district responsible for assuring that an
appropriate program is provided.’”61 The court reasoned that such
challenges were moot because the new school district is responsible
for providing the hearing.62 The federal administrative agency
subsequently explained that, “absent additional legal authority,” it
could not take action contrary to change this jurisdictional
difference.63
Conversely, a decision within the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue
of whether the IHO has jurisdiction for the case when the parents

57 D.S. v. District of Columbia, 699 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2010); see also
L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012).
58 This obligation is different from the child find and proportional-services
obligations for children voluntarily placed in private schools, which are based on
the school’s location, not the child’s residency. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
59 E.g., D.H. ex rel. R.H. v. Lowndes Cty. Sch. Dist., 57 IDELR ¶ 162 (M.D.
Ga. 2011); Alexis R. v. High Tech Middle Media Arts Sch., 53 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D.
Cal. 2009); Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. P.C., 308 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Mich.
2004).
60
Letter to Goetz & Reilly, 57 IDELR ¶ 80 (OSEP 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20104/goetzreilly100410dph4q2010.pdf.
61 Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir.
1998) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 120.173(b)(3)(e), renumbered § 125A.50 (2018)).
62 Id. at 578–79.
63 Letter to Goetz & Reilly, 58 IDELR ¶ 230 (OSERS 2012).
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moved their residence to outside the district and did not file for the
hearing until after moving.64
31. Who has the authority to determine whether a parent’s hearing
request constitutes a new issue compared to the parent’s previous
adjudicated request?
According to OSEP commentary accompanying the 1999 IDEA
regulations, this jurisdictional issue is for the IHO—not the school
district (or the SEA)—to decide.65
32. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues raised by the noncomplaining party during the pre-hearing or hearing process?
Similarly, according to the OSEP commentary accompanying the
2006 IDEA regulations, “such matters should be left to the discretion
of [IHOs] in light of the particular facts and circumstances of a
case.”66
33. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for cases that the parent has previously
subjected to CRP?
Yes, and they are not bound by the CRP rulings.67 However, the IHO
does not have jurisdiction in such cases as the appellate mechanism
for the SEA’s CRP rulings.68

A.H. v. Independence Sch. Dist., 466 S.W.3d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); Letter to
Wilde, 113 LRP 11932 (OSEP Oct. 3, 1990); see also Dispute Resolution
Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-16.
66 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
67 E.g., Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. P.C., 308 F. Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Mich.
2004); Lewis Cass Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. M.K., 290 F. Supp. 2d 832 (W.D.
Mich. 2003); Donlan v. Wells Ogunquit Cmty. Sch. Dist., 226 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.
Me. 2002); Letter to Douglas, 35 IDELR ¶ 278 (OSEP 2001),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20012/douglas041901dueprocess.pdf; Letter to Governors & Chief State Sch. Officers,
64
65
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34. Do IHOs have jurisdiction over FAPE issues for students whom
parents have voluntarily placed in private, including parochial,
schools (in contrast with those unilaterally placed for tuition
reimbursement)?
No, except for the Child Find obligation of the school district where
the private school is located.69 Arguably, an additional exception is
the extent that a few courts have interpreted state laws, such as those
providing for dual enrollment, as extending LEA obligations for
special education and related services to parentally-placed children in
private schools.70
35. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to decide the child’s residency as a
threshold issue antecedent to the IDEA merits of the case?
Yes, according to limited authority to date.71

34
IDELR
¶
264
(OSEP
2000),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20003/memo82900authorizationsec.pdf; Letter to Lieberman, 23 IDELR 351 (OSEP
1995).
68 E.g., Va. Office of Protection & Advocacy v. Va., 262 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D.
Va. 2003); see also Millay ex rel. YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep’t, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56
(D. Me. 2010).
69 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.140 (2018). For applications of this regulation, see, for example,
C.F. ex rel. Flick v. Del. Cty. Intermediate Unit, 70 IDELR ¶ 250 (E.D. Pa. 2017);
W. v. Sch. Bd., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch.
Dist., 241 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.N.H. 2003)
70 E.g., Veschi v. Nw. Lehigh Sch. Dist., 772 A.2d 469 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 382 (Pa. 2001); Dep’t of Educ. v. Grosse Point
Sch., 701 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); R.M.M. ex rel. Morales v.
Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). In its commentary
accompanying the 2006 IDEA regulations, OSEP opined that “[w]hether dual
enrollment alters the rights of parentally-placed private school children with
disabilities under State law is a State matter.” Assistance to States for the
Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With
Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,590.
71 E.g., A.P. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 294 F. Supp. 3d 406 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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36. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for Child Find claims, although the
IDEA is ambiguous or silent about this issue?
Yes, according to a Ninth Circuit decision.72
37. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for safety concerns with the child’s
IEP?
Yes.73
38. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for district’s promotion and retention
decisions?
No, according to OSEP, unless related to FAPE or placement, such as
where “a student does not receive the services that are specified on
his or her IEP that were designed to assist the student in meeting the
promotion standards.”74 Moreover, such matters may be regarded as
within the school district’s exclusive authority.75
39. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for claims of systemic IDEA
violations?
Although there may be exceptions where the issue is relatively
limited, and a single plaintiff is bringing the claim, the IHO generally
does not have jurisdiction for class-action type claims.76
40. Do IHOs have jurisdiction in terms of SEAs as defendants?
Not in most cases.77

Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison, 598 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010).
Lillbask ex rel. R.H. v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005).
74
Letter to Anonymous, 35 IDELR ¶ 35 (OSEP 2000),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20004/redact110900promotion.4q2000.pdf.
75 Cf. Saucon Valley Sch. Dist. v. Robert O., 785 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2001) (ruling the IHO’s remedy was ultra vires for gifted student).
76 E.g., N.J. Protection & Advocacy v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 2d
474 (D.N.J. 2008).
72
73
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41. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to determine and order the stay-put for
a child with disabilities?
Yes.78
42. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for parental challenges to an IEP that
the parent agreed to or an IEP that is not the most recent one?
Yes, according to OSEP, provided that the filing is within the
prescribed statute of limitations.79
43. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to override a parent’s refusal to
provide consent for initial services or for a parent’s subsequent
revocation of consent for continued services?
No, the regulations are rather clear that these matters are no longer
within the IHO’s jurisdiction.80 However, on the opposite side, the
commentary to the amended IDEA regulations add this clarification
for selective refusals:
If, however, the parent and the [district] disagree
about whether the child would be provided with FAPE
if the child did not receive a particular special
education or related service, the parent may use the
due process procedures in subpart E of these
E.g., Chavez v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 621 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010); cf.
R.W. ex rel. M.W. v. Ga. Dep’t of Educ., 48 IDELR ¶ 279 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff’d,
353 F. App’x 422 (11th Cir. 2009).
78 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,704 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Stohrer, 17
IDELR 55 (OSEP 1990); Letter to Chassey, 30 IDELR ¶ 51 (OSEP 1997). For
stay-put generally, see Perry A. Zirkel, “Stay-Put” under the IDEA: An Updated
Annotated Overview, 330 EDUC. L. REP. 8 (2016). For the strong status of the
IHO’s stay-put order upon a party’s challenge to it in court, see Abington Heights
Sch. Dist. v. A.C., 63 IDELR ¶ 97 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
79 Letter to Lipsitt, 52 IDELR ¶ 47 (OSEP 2008).
80 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.300(b)(3)(i), (4)(ii) (2018).
77
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regulations to obtain a ruling that the service with
which the parent disagrees is not appropriate for their
child.81
44. What if the parent’s refusal is for consent for an initial evaluation
and the child is either parentally placed in a private school or is
home-schooled?
Similarly, the IHO does not have jurisdiction to override the parent’s
refusal.82
45. Do IHOs have jurisdiction in disputes between two parents, who
both have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child,
with regard to consent or revocation of consent for special education
services?
No, according to OSEP’s interpretation. IHOs do not have
jurisdiction for any disputes between parents as compared to disputes
between parents and “public agencies.”83 In such cases, the IDEA
allows either parent to provide or revoke consent, with their
disagreements being subject exclusively (i.e., not under the IDEA) to
the resolution mechanisms available “based on State or local law.”84
Such consent disputes when concerned with evaluation, rather than
services, may be another matter.85

Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 73,006, 73,011 (Dec.
1,
2008)
(to
be
codified
at
34
C.F.R.
pt.
300),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-12-01/pdf/FR-2008-12-01.pdf.
82 Id. § 300.300(d)(4); see also Fitzgerald v. Camdenton R-III Sch. Dist., 439
F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2006); Durkee v. Livonia Cent. Sch. Dist., 487 F. Supp. 2d 313
(W.D.N.Y. 2007).
83 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a).
84
Letter
to
Cox,
54
IDELR
¶
60
(OSEP
2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20093/cox082109revocationofconsent3q2009.pdf; see also Letter to Ward, 56 IDELR ¶
237
(OSEP
2010),
https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/idea/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20103/ward083110revocofconsent3q2010.pdf.
85 E.g., J.H. v. Northfield Pub. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 165 (D. Minn. 2009);
Zeichner v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 881 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
81
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46. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for issues arising concerning the
education records of the child?
Although various hearing and review officers have broadly answered
this question with a “no,” often based on the coverage of FERPA,86
the more defensible answer would appear to be “it depends” in light
of the overlapping coverage of the IDEA. More specifically, if the
student records issue concerns the identification, evaluation, FAPE,
or placement of the child, it would appear to be within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the IHO,87 with one possible exception—if the issue
concerns amending the child’s records (based, for example, on
inaccurate or misleading information), the IDEA regulations may be
interpreted as reserving the matter exclusively for the FERPA
hearing procedure.88
47. Do IHOs have jurisdiction where the district offered, and the
parent refused, a settlement prior to the hearing that offered all the
relief that the parents sought?
Yes, according to an unpublished Fifth Circuit decision that
reasoned, apparently properly, that the effect under the IDEA may be
in terms of precluding recovery of attorneys’ fees but not subject
matter jurisdiction.89

E.g., Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 40 IDELR ¶ 221 (Mo. SEA 2004); Fairfax Cty.
Pub. Sch., 38 IDELR ¶ 275 (Va. SEA 2003); Bourne Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR ¶ 261
(Mass. SEA 2002).
87 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a), 300.613–21.
Additionally, a federal court
concluded that the IDEA reference (at Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2017)) to “all records” is more expansive than “education
records” under FERPA. Pollack ex rel. B.P. v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 65 IDELR ¶
206 (D. Me. 2015).
88 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.619-621. The additional scope of education records that,
alternatively, “are otherwise in violation of the privacy or other rights of the child”
extends the boundaries of the exception potentially to swallow the rule. Id. §
300.619. The opposing interpretation is that these regulations require, exhaustionlike, resort to the FERPA hearing procedure as a prerequisite for IHO jurisdiction.
89 A.O. v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 368 F. App’x 539 (5th Cir. 2010).
86
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48. Do IHOs have jurisdiction for enforcement of private settlement
agreements?
The limited case law is unsettled on this question. Some jurisdictions
support an affirmative answer,90 but other courts say no.91 OSEP has
stated that 1) the IDEA only provides for judicial enforcement of
settlement agreements as part of mediation or the resolution process,
and 2) a state may have uniform rules specific to an IHO’s authority
or lack of authority to review and enforce settlement agreements
reached outside of the mediation or resolution processes.92 Whether
exhaustion applies to judicial enforcement of settlement agreements
is a separate issue, which depends in part on the terms of the
settlement agreement.93

90 E.g., Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 202 (D. Conn. 2000); State v. v.
Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 307 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App.
2010); cf. Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Jeffrey B., 55 IDELR ¶ 158
(N.D. Ohio 2010); D.B.A. ex rel. Snerlling v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, Civ. No. 101045 (PAM/FLN), 2010 WL 5300946 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2010) (upholding IHO’s
authority to enforce mediated settlement agreement within limited circumstances);
State ex rel. St. Joseph Sch. v. Mo. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 307
S.W.3d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction to decide
whether settlement agreement existed and, if so, whether either party failed to
comply with it); I.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D.
Pa. 2013), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014); A.S. v. Office for Dispute
Resolution, 88 A.3d 256 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction
to decide whether settlement agreement existed); Smith v. Quakertown Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (ruling that IHO had jurisdiction for
interrelated claim for additional compensatory education).
91 E.g., H.C. v. Colton-Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist., 341 F. App’x 687 (2d Cir.
2009); W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. A.M., 164 A.3d 620 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017);
J.K. v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 833 F. Supp. 2d 436, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Sch.
Bd. of Lee Cty. v. M.C. ex rel. B.C., 35 IDELR ¶ 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
The West Chester Area School District decision also addressed whether the IHO
had jurisdiction to address the parent’s duress claim for the settlement agreement,
concluding that such jurisdiction existed under Pennsylvania law. W. Chester Area
Sch. Dist., 164 A.3d at 627.
92
Letter
to
Shaw,
50
IDELR
¶
78
(OSEP
2007),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20074/shaw121207dph4q2007.pdf.
93 F.H. v. Memphis City Sch., 64 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2014).
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49. Do IHOs have jurisdiction to enforce a previous IHO decision, an
issue typically arising when the parent claims that the school district
failed to implement the order(s) of the previous decision?
No. The prevailing view is that the two appropriate forums are the
state CRP under the IDEA94 and, alternatively via various legal
bases, the courts,95 rather than the IHO process.96

94
E.g., Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-29
(9th Cir. 2000); B.D. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 225 (D.D.C. 2014);
Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 115 (N.Y. SEA 2006);
Crown Point Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 269 (N.Y. SEA 2006); Newtown Bd. of
Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 201 (Conn. SEA 2004); see also Dispute Resolution
Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-26. But cf. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
M.L. ex rel. D.L., 50 IDELR ¶ 105 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (allowing IHO enforcement
based on state law). However, parents need not exhaust the state’s CRP before
seeking judicial enforcement of an IHO order. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 307 F.3d
1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, CRP—in contrast to a court—does not have
jurisdiction for an IHO’s refusal to hear or decide an issue. Letter to Hathcock, 19
IDELR 631 (OSEP 1993); cf. Letter to Jacobs, 48 IDELR ¶ 287 (OSEP 2007)
(interpreting the IDEA to allow appeals of IHO decisions to court—or. presumably,
to the second tier in the two-tier states—but not to the SEA where the IHO does not
work under the auspices of a “public agency,” such as when a separate state office
of
administrative
law
conducts
the
hearing),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20074/jacobs102507dph4q2007.pdf.
95
The usual procedure is a § 1983 action. E.g., Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon
Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996); Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d
1270, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1987); Dominique L. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 56
IDELR ¶ 65 (N.D. Ill. 2011); L.J. ex rel. V.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR
¶ 100 (D.N.J. 2006). However, the § 1983 avenue may be open only to parents, not
districts. E.g., Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Buskirk, 950 F. Supp. 899, 903 (S.D. Ind.
1997). Another alternative is under Section 504 and the ADA. E.g., Stropkay v.
Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 593 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014); A. v. Hartford
Bd. of Educ., 976 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D. Conn. 2013); T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 152 (S.D. Cal. 2011). Where the district
belatedly implemented the IHOs orders, a federal court ruled that the parents
lacked standing for such an enforcement action. A.S. v. Harrison Twp. Bd. of
Educ., 66 F. Supp. 3d 539, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). Finally, the courts are split as to
whether the IDEA is a viable avenue for judicial enforcement. E.g., B.D. v.
District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing the case law to
date and rejecting the view that a particular provision of the IDEA provides such a
cause of action).
96
However, the concurring judge in a recent federal appeals court decision
pointed to the U.S. Department of Education’s brief in a previous case to conclude
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50. Do IHOs have the authority—whether viewed as a matter of
jurisdiction or remedies—to raise and resolve an issue sua sponte,
i.e., on their own without either party raising it?
This issue is unsettled. An OSEP policy interpretation seems to
suggest a “yes” answer for the particular issue of the child’s “stayput.”97 On the other hand, the limited case law arguably answers
“no” to this question more generally whether viewed as a matter of
the underlying issue or the predicate remedy, whether for
declaratory98 or injunctive99 relief.
that the IHO route “might” be viable. B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792,
803–04 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Moreover, where the district is the initiating party, the
answer may vary. Compare Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.U., 63 IDELR ¶ 250
(E.D. Cal. 2014), with Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 741 F. Supp. 2d 920
(N.D. Ill. 2010). For the related issue of whether the IHO has the jurisdiction to
reopen the case upon the request of either party for enforcement purposes, see Bd.
of Educ. of Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 337 (N.Y. SEA 1998). For the
applicable time period for implementation, see Letter to Voigt, 64 IDELR ¶ 220
(OSEP 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acc-11020700r-pa-voigt-dueprocesshearingdecisions.pdf.
97 Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997). The question to OSEP
contained the at least partial sua sponte condition that “stay put is not raised as an
issue during the pre-hearing stages,” but the answer did not specifically
differentiate this contingency.
98 E.g., C.W.L. v. Pelham Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp. 3d 451
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Saki ex rel. Saki v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 103 (D.
Haw. 2008); Mifflin Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process Appeals Bd., 800
A.2d 1010 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Bd. of Educ. v. Redovian, 18 IDELR 1092
(N.D. Ohio 1992). The third case provides only limited authority, because the
court was addressing the authority of the second-tier review panel, not the IHO,
and its rationale included that doing so “without the benefit of a full factual record
and adjudication on the issue [would result in] in a premature interruption of the
administrative process.” Mifflin Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Special Educ. Due Process
Appeals Bd., 800 A.2d at 1014.
99 E.g., District of Columbia v. Walker, 109 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2015);
Lofisa S. ex rel. S.S. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 60 IDELR ¶ 191 (D. Haw. 2013);
Sch. Bd. of Martin Cty. v. A.S., 727 So.2d 1071 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999); cf.
Neshaminy Sch. Dist. v. Karla B. ex rel. Blake B., 26 IDELR 827 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Slack v. Del. Dep’t of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1993); Mars Area Sch.
Dist. v. Laurie L., 827 A.2d 1249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (ruling specific to IDEA
review officers). The first decision was the only one specific to IHOs, and it is
ambiguous as to whether the basis was functus officio rather than sua sponte.
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51. Does expiration of the forty-five-day period prior to the start of
the hearing, including any extensions,
deprive the IHO of
jurisdiction for the case?
No, according to a federal district court decision in Hawaii. Contrary
to the IHO’s interpretation, the court concluded that this automatic
divestiture of jurisdiction would “fl[y] in the face of the very spirit of
the IDEA” and could result in a “serious injustice” to the rights of the
parent and child with a disability.100
52. In a disciplinary hearing, where manifestation determination is at
issue, does the IHO have jurisdiction to determine whether the
student violated the school’s code of conduct?
Yes. More specifically, according to OSEP, “there may be instances
where a hearing officer, in his discretion, would address whether
such a violation has occurred.”101
53. Do IHOs have the authority to dispose of a case on the grounds of
mootness?
Yes, but they should make sure that the case meets the applicable
relatively narrow standard for mootness.102
54. Do IHOs have jurisdiction when the parent names a SEA as a
defendant?
According to OSEP, this issue is within the IHO’s discretionary
authority. More specifically, the IHO “has the authority to
determine, based on the individual facts and circumstances in the

Paul K. ex rel. Joshua K. v. State of Haw., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 (D.
Haw. 2008).
101 Letter to Ramirez, 60 IDELR ¶ 230 (OSEP 2012); cf. District of Columbia
v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (ruling that this issue is within IHO’s
authority if matter of FAPE).
102 E.g., Morris v. District of Columbia, 38 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2014).
100
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case, whether the SEA is a proper party to the due process
hearing.”103
55. May a state, through its procedures, or the IHO limit the issues to
those previously raised at the IEP team level?
Not according to OSEP, because such limits “would impose
additional procedural hurdles on the right to a due process hearing
that are not contemplated by the IDEA.”104
56. Do IHOs have remedial authority for the extent of related
services determined by another agency via an interagency agreement
under state law?
Yes, according to a Ninth Circuit decision. However, the answer
ultimately depends not only on the IDEA but also the state (which, in
this case, was California) law.105
D. Timelines in General
57. If the district allegedly failed to respond to the parents’ due
process complaint within the required ten-day period, what is the
appropriate avenue of relief?

Letter to Anonymous, 69 IDELR ¶ 189 (OSEP 2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl-anonymous-dueprocess-01-02-2017.pdf. For the overlapping case law, including the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Chavez v. New Mexico Public Education Department, 621
F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010) that OSEP indirectly cited, see Perry A. Zirkel, State
Education Agencies as Defendants under the IDEA and Related Federal Laws: A
Compilation of the Court Decisions, 336 EDUC. L. REP. 667 (2016).
104
Letter
to
Lenz,
37
IDELR
¶
95
(OSEP
2002),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2002-1/lenz030602notice.pdf;
see also Letter to Dowaliby, 38 IDELR ¶ 14 (OSEP 2002),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2002-2/dowaliby0626022q2002.pdf; Letter to Zimberlin, 34 IDELR ¶ 150 (OSEP 2000),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20004/zimberlin101900dueprocess.4q2000.pdf.
105 Douglas v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 650 F. App’x 312 (9th Cir.
2016).
103
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According to OSEP, the appropriate recourse is for the parents to
proceed with the hearing, with the IHO having the discretion to
identify and resolve this issue.106
58. What is the statute of limitations for filing for a due process
hearing under the IDEA?
In short, two years unless state law prescribes a different period.107
However, the interpretation and application of the statutory language,
which the regulations repeat without elaboration, are complicated.
The complications include (1) determination of the triggering point
of when the parent or district had actual or constructive notice of the
alleged action; (2) the scope of the two specified exceptions; and (3)
the potentially broadening effect of the alleged action and its
redressability. 108
59. Does the IDEA’s statute of limitations for an impartial hearing
call for a “look back” approach from the filing date?
No, the starting point is the date that the filing party “knew of should
have known” of the alleged violation.109
60. Have courts generally interpreted the exceptions for the
limitations period broadly or narrowly?
Although the case law is limited and not uniform, the majority of
courts have taken a rather narrow view.110

Letter to Inzelbuch, supra note 56. Given its overlapping subject matter
and breadth, this OSEP letter is also included in the Jurisdiction section. Id.
107 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B),
(f)(3)(C)-(D) (2017).
108 For a systematic synthesis of the case law, see Perry A. Zirkel, The Statute
of Limitations for an Impartial Hearing Under the IDEA: A Guiding Checklist, 363
Ed. Law Rep. 483 (2019).
109 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).
110 E.g., Zirkel, supra note 108, at 487 nn.34 & 36.
106
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61. If the IHO exceeds the forty-five-day regulatory deadline, is a
reviewing court likely to provide the challenging party with remedial
relief?
Not in the majority of the cases, because the courts treat it as a
procedural violation, which often does not result in harm to the
student. For example, in a Seventh Circuit case where the court
upheld the IHO’s decision that the district had provided an
appropriate program for the child, the parent’s claim was to no
avail.111 Conversely, in the minority of cases where the court
concludes that this procedural violation is prejudicial, this conclusion
may contribute to one or more consequences to the defendant LEA—
attorneys’ fees,112 an exception to the exhaustion doctrine,113 the

Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045 (7th Cir. 1995); see also J.D. v. Pawlet
Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2000); Amann v. Stow, 982 F.3d 644 (1st Cir.
1992); Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 133 (D. Ariz. 2017);
Oskowis v. Sedona-Oak Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 150 (D. Ariz.
2016); O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. District of Columbia, 573 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C.
2008); Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 571 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2008); E.M.
v. Pajaro Valley Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 39 (E.D. Cal. 2007); G.W. v. New Haven
Unified Sch. Dist., 46 IDELR ¶ 103 (ND. Cal. 2006); Grant ex rel. Sunderlin v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 43 IDELR ¶ 219 (D. Minn. 2005).
112 E.g., Miller v. Monroe Sch. Dist., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
(awarding tuition reimbursement); cf. K.J. ex rel. K.J., Jr. v. Greater Egg Harbor
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 179 (D.N.J. 2015); Rose ex rel. Rose v.
Chester Cty. Intermediate Unit, 24 IDELR 61 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d mem., 114
F.3d 1173 (3d Cir. 1997) (suggesting possible § 504 violation). Other courts have
identified consequences in terms of attorneys’ fees. E.g., Scorah v. District of
Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2004) (contributing to attorneys’ fees
award); Engwiller v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 110 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (ruling that state violated IDEA timeliness requirement for failing to take
appropriate action in response to IHO’s failure to issue her decision after a
protracted period, resulting in attorneys’ fees and possibly other consequences
adverse to the LEA or SEA); Bd. of Educ. of Green Local Sch. Dist. v. Redovian,
18 IDELR 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (suggesting possible attorneys’ fees where no
denial of FAPE). But see K.C. ex rel. Eric C. v. N.Y.C. Educ. Dep’t, 66 IDELR ¶
123 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (ruling that plaintiff-parents obtaining the requested relief in
terms of receiving overdue, but unfavorable decision does not qualify them as
prevailing parties for attorneys’ fees).
113 E.g., M.G. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 15 F. Supp. 3d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
McAdams v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 2d 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
111
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extension of the period for tuition reimbursement,114 other
remediable denial of FAPE,115 or the possibility (under § 504) of
compensatory damages.116 A district’s failure to process the parents’
request for an impartial hearing is a separate matter; in flagrant
circumstances a court may order remedial relief even in the absence
of denial of FAPE.117 Regardless of the judicial consequences, OSEP
continues to emphasize its responsibility to monitor compliance with
this timeline, with the limited exception being for allowable
extensions.118
62. Do the IDEA regulations’ allowance for extensions excuse any
such alleged delay?
Yes, but 1) the extensions must be requested by a party (not
unilaterally by the IHO) and for specific periods of time;119 and 2) the
defendant agency—whether the LEA or the SEA—ultimately must
show the documentation and justification for the extensions.120
114 E.g., Rose, 24 IDELR 61. But cf. C.W. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 395
F. App’x 824 (3d Cir. 2010) (not where no denial of FAPE).
115 Miller v. Monroe Sch. Dist., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
(ruled that the district denied FAPE to the child for the 142-day period beyond the
seventy-five-day timeline that was attributable to district-requested, parentobjected-to postponements, entitling parent to tuition reimbursement for that
limited period of FAPE denial); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d
71, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (ruling that systemic failure to provide timely hearings and
decisions was per se violation of FAPE); cf. Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. T.G. ex rel.
Cheryl G., 56 IDELR ¶ 97 (D. Haw. 2011) (adopting per se denial of FAPE
approach for outright denial to provide a hearing).
116 K.J., 65 IDELR ¶ 179 (dismissing IDEA claim as moot but denying
dismissal of § 504 money damages claim).
117 I.R. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2015).
118 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-21.
119 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(c) (2018). According to OSEP, the IHO need not grant the
request for an extension, and where the IHO does grant it, the IHO must provide
the parties with notice of not only this ruling but also the specific date for the final
decision. Letter to Kerr, 22 IDELR 364 (OSEP 1994). More recently, OSEP
emphasized that the extension must be for a specific period even if the requesting
party does not specify a time period. Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note
17, at item C-22.
120 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Conn.
2000); see also L.C. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 125 F. App’x 252 (10th Cir. 2005).
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63. Does the IHO have discretion to deny such requests?
Yes, subject to state law,121 denying continuances is within an IHO’s
good faith discretion with due consideration to unrepresented
parents.122
64. May states specify time lines that differ from those that the IDEA
specifies for situations not expressly authorized in the IDEA?
Not, under the preemption doctrine,123 if they provide less protection
to the child, unless the IDEA expressly provides for state variation,
as it does for the limitations periods124 or for evaluation.125
65. Does the SEA’s monitoring responsibility to assure correction of
noncompliance within one year limit the IHO’s remedial order for
compensatory education to one year?
For related dicta as to the possible consequences of abusing the extension
exception, see Doe v. East Greenwich School Department, 899 A.2d 1258 (R.I.
2006).
121 E.g., Lake Washington Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Superintendent of
Pub. Instruction, 51 IDELR ¶ 278 (D. Wash. 2009), aff’d, 634 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
2011); J.S. ex rel. John S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 153 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (upholding IHO’s discretion to refuse postponement under applicable N.Y.
regulation); J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 253 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) (refusing district’s request to enjoin IHO’s extension to parent under
state “good cause” standard).
122 E.g., P.J. v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist. 248 F. App’x 775 (9th Cir. 2007);
A.S. v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 62 (E.D. Pa. 2014); J.D. ex rel. Davis
v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 225 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), aff’d mem.,
357 F. App’x 515 (4th Cir. 2009); Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndborough Cooperative
Sch. Dist., 47 IDELR ¶ 299 (D.N.H. 2007); D.Z v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2
A.3d 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); O’Neil v. Shamokin Area Sch. Dist., 41 IDELR
¶ 154 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004); cf. Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist.,
655 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting 14th Amendment procedural due
process claim).
123 The doctrine, which is based on the supremacy clause in the Constitution,
applies at least if the conflict, and Congressional intent for supplanting state law, is
“clear and manifest.” E.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 655 (1995).
124 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507(a)(2), 300.516(b).
125 Id. § 300.301(c).
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No, not in light of the statute of limitations and broad IHO remedial
authority under the IDEA. OSEP recently appeared to agree with the
inapplicability or at least relaxed applicability of the regulation
requiring the state to correct noncompliance “as soon as possible, and
in no case later than one year”126 by opining that “hearing decisions
must be implemented within the timeframe prescribed by the [IHO]
or, if there is no timeframe prescribed by the [IHO], within a
reasonable timeframe set by the State as required by 34 CFR §§
500.111–300.514.”127 Nevertheless, it is effective practice for IHOs
write their remedial orders in such a way that the state can verify the
district’s initiation of implementation and plan for completion of the
award.
E. Expedited Hearings
66. Under what circumstances is the parent entitled to an expedited
hearing?
The IDEA regulations require the opportunity for an expedited
hearing when the parent challenges a manifestation determination or
any other aspect of a district-imposed disciplinary change in
placement or interim alternate educational setting.128
67. Under what circumstances are school districts entitled to an
expedited hearing?
The school district must have the opportunity for such a hearing upon
requesting an interim alternate educational setting based on
substantial likelihood of the current placement resulting in injury to
the child or others.129
68. What is the timeline for an expedited hearing?
Id. § 300.600(e).
Letter to Zirkel, 68 IDELR ¶ 142 (OSEP 2016).
128 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1).
129 Id.; see also Letter to Huefner, 47 IDELR ¶ 228 (OSEP 2007),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20071/huefner030807stayput1q2007.pdf.
126
127
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Unless the state has adopted different procedural rules, the deadlines
are as follows, starting with the receipt of the complaint: resolution
session – within seven days; hearing – within twenty school days;
decision – within thirty school days (actually, within ten school days
of the hearing if the hearing is more than one session).130 According
to OSEP, the reference to “school days” for the second and third
parts of this specified schedule includes days during the summer
period for school districts that “operate summer school programs for
both students with, and students without, disabilities,” but not when
the summer programming is only ESY.131 Moreover, OSEP clarified
that the overall forty-five-day deadline, upon completion of the
resolution period, applies regardless of whether the summer days
count for these two steps.132
69. Do the IDEA provisions for specific IHO extensions apply,
whether directly upon the request of one or both parties or via state
law, to expedited hearings?
Apparently not, because—as summarized in the previous item—the
IDEA regulation for expedited hearings provides its own timeline
and the express allowance for state law variations preserves these
deadlines. 133 OSEP recently reached this conclusion, reasoning that
“[t]here is no provision in the Part B regulations that would give a

34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2)-(4). The references to school days would seem
to conflict during the summer months with the general requirement for issuance of
the decision within forty-five calendar days after completion of the resolutionsession period. Id. § 300.515(a). However, the absence of extensions, or
postponements, in the regulations for expedited hearings potentially mitigates this
possible conflict.
131
Letter to Fletcher, 72 IDELR ¶ 275 (OSEP 2018),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-to-fletcher08-23-2018.pdf; Letter to Cox, 59 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/06-2212expdph3q2012.pdf; see also Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at
item E-5.
132 Id.
133 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(4). However, the accompanying preserved crossreferenced regulations for non-expedited hearings do not include the one
concerning extensions. Id. § 300.515(c).
130
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hearing officer conducting an expedited due process hearing the
authority to extend the timeline for issuing this determination at the
request of a party to the expedited due process hearing.”134 More
recently, OSEP reaffirmed this conclusion, emphasizing that waiver
of the IDEA timeline for expedited hearings is not permissible.135
70. In expedited hearings, does the usual five-day disclosure rule
apply or does a special two-day rule replace it?
Although the proposed IDEA regulations contained a two-day
exception for expedited hearings, the final version retained the fiveday rule without exception.136 The Agency’s stated reasoning was
that “limiting the disclosure time to two days would significantly
impair the ability of the parties to prepare for the hearing, since one
purpose of the expedited hearing is to provide protection to the
child.”137 In an analogous case under state law, a federal court in
New Jersey remanded the case back to the IHO for a new hearing
based on the prejudicial effect of not providing the requisite five-day
notice.138
71. For expedited hearings, may a party challenge the sufficiency of
the complaint or may an IHO otherwise extend the timeline for
completion?
No, according to OSEP.139

Letter
to
Snyder,
67
IDELR
¶
96
(OSEP
2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/15-012744-ca-snyderexdueprocess-clearance.pdf.
135
Letter
to
Zirkel,
68
IDELR
¶
142
(OSEP
2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/oseplettertozirkel8-2216.pdf.
136 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(1) (incorporating id. § 300.512(a)(3) without
exception).
137 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,726 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
138 B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014).
139 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item E-6.
134
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72. Do the requirements for expedited hearings apply if the hearing
request encompasses both the requisite disciplinary circumstances
and one or more other issues?
In light of the qualified discretion accorded to IHOs, OSEP opines
that in such cases “a hearing officer could decide that it is prudent to
bifurcate the hearing, thus allowing for an expedited hearing on the
discipline and removal issues, and a separate hearing on any other
issues.”140
F. Prehearing and Hearing Procedures, Including Evidentiary
Matters
73. Does a school district practice of providing the IHO with a copy
of the student’s records immediately upon receiving notice of the
IHO’s appointment violate the IDEA, including its incorporated
FERPA requirements?
Not according to OSEP, regardless of whether the parent or the
district was the filing party.141
74. Are discovery procedures available in IDEA due process
hearings?
The IDEA does not provide for discovery (beyond the five-day
rule),142 and only a minority of state laws provide for it in IDEA
hearings.143 If state law is silent in this matter, OSEP has stated that
whether discovery procedures are available and, if so, their nature
and extent are within the discretion of the IHO. 144 In a Florida case,
the appellate court held that in the absence of state law the IHO

Letter to Snyder, supra note 134.
Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).
142 E.g., B.H. ex rel. S.H. v. Joliet Sch. Dist. No. 86, 54 IDELR ¶ 121 (N.D. Ill.
2010); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806
(N.D. Ohio 2009).
143 Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (identifying 19 states that have some form of
discovery though not necessarily the full procedures of civil courts).
144 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).
140
141
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lacked authority to order discovery.145 However, a year later the
Florida’s legislature repealed the exemption of IDEA hearings from
the statute providing such authority.146
In the minority of
jurisdictions that allow for discovery in IDEA cases, such as Florida
and Massachusetts, related legal issues come to the fore.147
75. Does the IDEA require a prehearing conference?
No, although it is generally regarded as best practice for IHOs, and
some state laws require it.148
76. Does the IDEA specify the time or place for the hearing?
No, except that the time and place be reasonably convenient to the
parents and the child.149
77. Must the IHO enter a default judgment against the district for
failing to file a sufficient response to the parents' complaint within
ten days of service?
No, as the Ninth Circuit explained, the IDEA only requires the
district to “send to the parent a response” to the complaint and, thus,
“[a] due process hearing is the redress for an unsatisfactory
response.”150
78. What is the proper procedure if the district fails to file any
response at all to the complaint?

S.T. ex rel. S.F. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 783 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
146 FLA. STAT. § 120.569(2)(f) (2018).
147 E.g., Andover Pub. Sch., 68 IDELR ¶ 208 (Mass. SEA 2016) (partially
granting parent’s discovery request, specifically allowing for the redacted IEPs and
504 plans, but not the other specified information, for other students in the child’s
proposed placement).
148 E.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02a(g)(40) (2018).
149 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.515(d) (2018).
150 G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 F.
App‘x 698, 699 (9th Cir. 2014).
145
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According to the Ninth Circuit, rather than go forward with
hearing, the IHO “must order a response and shift the cost of
delay to the school district, regardless of who is ultimately
prevailing party.”151 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit advised that
IHO should raise the issue sua sponte even if the parent does
make a motion on this matter.152

the
the
the
the
not

79. Does the IDEA allow the filing party to amend the complaint?
Yes, but only if (a) the other party consents in writing to the
amendment and has the opportunity to resolve the due process
complaint through the resolution meeting; or (b) the IHO grants
permission no later than five calendar days before the first hearing
session.153
80. Do IHOs have authority to dismiss a case and, if so, with
prejudice?
IHOs certainly have the authority for dismissal in certain
circumstances.154 First, the IDEA regulations provide some of these
circumstances, such as explicitly authorizing dismissals with regard
to parents’ failure to participate in resolution sessions155 and
implicitly authorizing dismissals with regard to complaints that the
hearing officer deems to be insufficient.156

M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d
1189, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2017).
152 Id. at 1200 n.6.
153 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(d)(3).
154 E.g., Timothy E. Gilsbach, Special Education Due Process Hearing
Requests under the IDEA: A Hearing Should Not Always Be Required, 2015
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 187 (2015).
155 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4).
156 Id. § 300.508(c). As a general matter, OSEP has opined that “apart from the
hearing rights set out at § 300.308, decisions regarding the conduct of Part B due
process hearings are left to the discretion of hearing officers.” Letter to
Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073, 1075 (OSEP 1995).
151
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Second, some state laws provide IHOs with authority for dismissals
with or without prejudice.157 For example, Georgia authorizes the
IHO to write a decision for dismissal with prejudice when the party
with the burden of production does not meet its burden of
persuasion158 and to issue a dismissal without prejudice upon a
party’s motion for voluntary dismissal for cause.159
Third, courts have delineated other circumstances, such as a federal
court decision upholding dismissal with prejudice where the parents
repeatedly violated the IHO’s hearing orders160 and another federal
court decision ruling that dismissal with prejudice should be reserved
for extreme cases, with close calls—especially for pro se parents—
being against this sanction.161
In general, it would appear to be advisable to 1) hold a hearing where
the basis is a factual matter of material dispute;162 2) limit dismissals
with prejudice to cases of rather egregious conduct by the filing
party, whether separately sanctionable or not;163 and 3) issue a
written opinion with factual findings and legal conclusions sufficient
to withstand judicial review.164 Finally, for the variation of a
E.g., Edward S. ex rel. T.S. v. W. Noble Sch. Corp., 63 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D.
Ind. 2014); Stancourt v. Worthington City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 44 IDELR ¶ 166
(Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding dismissal with prejudice under state law); cf.
T.W. v. Spencerport Cent. Sch. Dist., 891 F. Supp. 2d 438 (W.D.N.Y. 2012)
(review officer dismissal with prejudice under state law standards).
158 E.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 616-1-2.35 (2010).
159 Id. 160-4-7-.12(3)(m).
160 Edward S., 63 IDELR ¶ 34.
161 Nickerson-Reti v. Lexington Pub. Sch., 893 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D. Mass.
2012); cf. Mylo v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cty., 948 F.2d 1282 (4th Cir. 1991)
(ruling, specific to judicial action, that the sanction for the parent should not
generally extend to dismissal for the student).
162 E.g., Hazelton Area Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 30 (Pa. SEA 2001).
163 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Hillsdale Cmty. Sch., 32 IDELR ¶ 62 (Mich. SEA
1999).
164 For examples of IHO decisions that did not meet this sufficiency test, see
Wehrspann v. Dubuque Cmty Sch. Dist., 118 LRP 33775, adopted, 72 IDELR ¶
212 (N.D. Iowa 2018); A.B. v. Clarke Cty. Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 259 (M.D. Ga.
2009). Of course, even where the decision is sufficiently specific, it is subject to
being reversed on appeal to court. E.g., Alexandra R. ex rel. Burke v. Brookline
Sch. Dist., 53 IDELR ¶ 93 (D.N.H. 2009).
157
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contingent order of dismissal with prejudice, a federal district court
upheld the authority under an IHO’s equitable powers when state law
does not expressly prohibit such an order, with the possible abuse of
discretion based on the circumstances.165
81. Do IHOs have wide discretion with regard in conducting the
hearing, including determining the scope of evidence?
Yes.166 For example, the weighing of testimony, even in the absence
of rebuttal or objection, is within the IHO’s authority.167 The
generally applicable judicial standard of review is abuse of
discretion, which usually favors the IHO.168 However, the federal
Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2014). In this
case, the court concluded that the contingent order of dismissal with prejudice was
not an abuse of discretion where the filing party withdrew her complaint one week
before the hearing and the IHO allowed thirty days for either refilling or requesting
recusal. However, the court recommended that additional findings of facts and
statements of appeals rights “might have been helpful to all parties.” Id. at 68.
166 In the commentary accompanying the IDEA regulations, OSEP’s
illustrations of IHO’s broad procedural discretion include 1) determining
appropriate expert witness testimony (Assistance to States for the Education of
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,691 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300)); 2)
ruling upon compliance with timelines and the statute of limitations (id. at 46,70546,706); 3) determining whether the non-complaining party may raise other issues
at the hearing not specified in the complaint (id. at 46706); and 4) providing proper
latitude for pro se parties (id. at 46,699).
167 McAllister v. District of Columbia, 53 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014).
168 E.g., O’Toole v. Olathe Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 709 (10th
Cir. 1998); Price v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 214 (E.D. Pa. 2016); D.Z.
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2 A.3d 712, 721 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010); cf. Sch.
Bd. of Norfolk v. Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928 (E.D. Va. 2010) (upholding time
limits and extensions favoring parents); Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia,
535 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2008) (upholding IHO’s exclusion of evidence);
Renollett v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 42 IDELR ¶ 201 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d on
other grounds, 440 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding IHO’s limiting the issues,
per state law for timely hearings). But cf. J.C. ex rel. J.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,
66 IDELR ¶ 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); S.W. ex rel. W.W. v. Florham Park Bd. of
Educ., 70 IDELR ¶ 46 (D.N.J. 2017) (prejudicial exclusion). For further support of
the prevailing view, see the commentary accompanying the regulations. 71 Fed.
Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (“The specific application of those [general
regulatory] procedures to particular cases generally should be left to the discretion
of hearing officers who have the knowledge and ability to conduct hearings in
165

70

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

38-2

district court for the District of Columbia has required IHOs to
provide parents with a flexible opportunity for providing evidence to
support the remedies of tuition reimbursement and compensatory
education where the parents prove the requisite entitlement for such
relief.169 Similarly, courts have provided ample latitude to IHOs in
maintaining an efficient completion of the case, keeping the parties
focused on the issues.170
82. Do IHOs have the authority to determine procedural issues that
the IDEA does not address?
Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as “such determinations are
made in a manner that is consistent with a parent’s or a public
agency's right to a timely due process hearing.”171
83. What are the key factors that IHOs should carefully consider and
reasonably explain in their credibility determinations?
Although various factors may apply depending on the circumstances,
they include the extent of the witness’s pertinent experience with the
child172 and the witness’s relevant expertise.173
accordance with standard legal practice. There is nothing in the Act or these
regulations that would prohibit a hearing officer from making determinations on
procedural matters not addressed in the Act so long as such determinations are
made in a manner that is consistent with a parent’s or a public agency’s right to a
timely due process hearing”).
169 A.G. v. District of Columbia, 794 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2011); Gill ex
rel. W.G. v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2010), further
proceedings, 770 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011); Henry v. District of Columbia,
750 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2010).
170 E.g., A.M. v. District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2013).
171 Letter to Cohen, supra note 22 (citing Assistance to States for the Education
of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities,
71 Fed. Reg. at 46,704).
172 E.g., Sebastian M. v. King Philip Reg’l Sch. Dist., 685 F.3d 79 (1st Cir.
2012); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Michael R. ex rel. Lindsey
R., 44 IDELR ¶ 36 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2007); cf. W.
Windsor-Plainsboro Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. J.S. ex rel. M.S., 44 IDELR ¶
159 (D.N.J. 2005) (ruling that exclusive reliance on parents’ experts as “utterly
persuasive” was unsupported in the record and, thus, not entitled to any deference).
The child’s teachers and other regular service providers merit special attention in
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84. Do the Federal Rules of Evidence, such as Rule 702 concerning
the standard for expert witnesses, apply to IDEA impartial hearings?
Not directly, because they apply to federal courts; state courts may
follow a different standard.174 If state law does not specify the
applicable procedural rules for IHOs, the Federal Rules would appear
to provide guidance by analogy within the broad discretion of
IHOs.175 In general, the IDEA does not require detailed procedures
and formal rules evidence.176

this regard. E.g., Heather S. v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1997);
Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Smith, 230 F. Supp. 2d 704, 730 (E.D. Va. 2002).
However, this factor is not without limits and is partly jurisdictional. K.S. ex rel.
P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004–1005 (N.D. Cal.
2008). For example, in the Ninth Circuit, the view was that according deference to
the testimony of school personnel based on the child-experience factor, without
careful consideration of the parents’ witnesses, would not only create a
discriminatory standard but also obviate the need for an impartial hearing. Id. For
another example of the non-bright limits, compare the majority and minority (and
lower court) opinions in the Fourth Circuit’s 2-to-1 decision in County School
Board of Henrico County v. Z.P., 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005).
173 This overlapping factor often extends to the child’s teachers and other
district professional personnel, but not exclusively or arbitrarily. E.g., K.S. ex rel.
P.S. v. Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d,
426 F. App’x 536 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Marshall Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. C.D.
ex rel. Brian D., 616 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (distinction between medical
and educational professionals).
174 E.g., People v. Basler, 710 N.E.2d 431 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that
Illinois state courts follow the Frye, not Daubert, standard for expert witnesses).
175 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities
and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 46,691. For a
more complete analysis, see Perry A. Zirkel, Expert Witnesses in Impartial
Hearings under the IDEA, 298 EDUC. L. REP. 648 (2014).
176 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Sergi, 117 F. Supp. 2d 182, 192 (D.
Conn. 2000):
Due process does not require formal rules of evidence and procedure.
Detailed rules of procedure are no panacea against lengthy,
contentious, wasteful, divisive, or delay-causing arguments. Indeed,
highly formalized systems of legal procedure can be fodder for delay.
Due process is not always served by bringing every dispute into a
mini-courtroom where only lawyers can navigate the myriad rules. A
formalized system could serve to disenfranchise and exclude the very
people meant to be served, namely the parents and the educators.
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85. May an IHO limit the number of days for the hearing?
Yes, according to OSEP, just as long as the IHO provides the parties
with the hearing rights that the regulations prescribe.177 Although
OSEP has referred to the IHO’s responsibility “to accord each party a
meaningful opportunity to exercise these rights during the course of
the hearing,”178 the courts’ aforementioned abuse of discretion
standard provides ample latitude to the IHO to rule in favor of
efficiency, particularly in light of the forty-five day regulatory
deadline.179 More recently, OSEP has opined that a state bestpractice guideline limiting a hearing to three sessions of six hours per
session does not violate the IDEA just as long as it allows the IHO to
make an exception. 180
86. Do IHOs have the discretion to determine the consequences of
not meeting the five-day disclosure deadline?
A literal reading of the regulation would suggest an answer of No. 181
However, the authority to date supports an answer of Yes, including,

177 Letter to Kerr, 22 IDELR 364 (OSEP 1994). For the prescribed hearing
rights, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.512. OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of
Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2018).
178 Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995).
179 E.g., B.S. ex rel. K.S. v. Anoka Hennepin Pub. Sch., 799 F.3d 1217 (8th
Cir. 2015) (upholding prehearing order of 9 hours per party based on circumstances
of the case, including state law); T.M. v. District of Columbia, 75 F. Supp. 3d 233
(D.D.C. 2014) (viewing limitation on cross-examination as reasonable in the
context of hearing specified in prehearing order as maximum of four days); A.M. v.
District of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193, 207 (D.D.C. 2013) (viewing the IHO’s
reduction of repetitive testimony and sua sponte questions in completing hearing in
one day as efficiency rather than incompetence or bias); cf. L.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of
Lansing Sch. Dist. 158, 65 IDELR ¶ 225 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v.
Brown, 769 F. Supp. 2d 928, 938 (E.D. Va. 2010) (upholding IHO’s enforcement
of time limits set with parties’ agreement).
180
Letter
to
Kane,
65
IDELR
¶
20
(OSEP
2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/acc-13-017562r-mnkane-dph.pdf.
181 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(3) (2018) (“Any party to a hearing . . . has the right to . . .
[p]rohibit the introduction of any evidence . . . that has not been disclosed to that
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but not limited, to prohibiting the introduction of the evidence or
allowing the rescheduling of the hearing.182
87. Does the IHO have the authority to allow testimony by telephone
or television?
According to OSEP, this matter is within the IHO’s discretion,
subject to judicial review in terms of whether the parties had
meaningful opportunity to exercise the rights specified in the IDEA
regulations, including the right to “present evidence and confront,
cross-examine and compel the attendance of witnesses.”183
However, except where the parties jointly agree or where state law
party at least five business days before the hearing.). But cf. “The [IHO] may bar
[evaluations not meeting five-day deadline]. Id. § 300.512(b)(2).
182 E.g., Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities
and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64
Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,614 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300);
Letter to Steinke, 18 IDELR 739 (OSEP 1992); see also Pottsgrove Sch. Dist. v.
D.H., 72 IDELR ¶ 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018); E.P. ex rel. J.P. v. Howard Cty. Pub. Sch.
Sys., 70 IDELR ¶ 176 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d mem., 727 F. App’x 55 (4th Cir. 2018);
L.B. v. Kyrene Elementary Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 150 (D. Ariz. 2018); J.H. ex
rel. L.H. v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 72 IDELR ¶ 123 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Jason O.
v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 41, 173 F. Supp. 3d 744 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Avila v.
Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 64 IDELR ¶ 171 (E.D. Wash. 2014); L.J. ex rel. V.J. v.
Audubon Bd. of Educ., 51 IDELR ¶ 37 (D.N.J. 2008); Warton v. New Fairfield Bd.
of Educ., 217 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D. Conn. 2002). There are no “tests” for the IHO to
follow in making such determinations, but the purpose of the rule is, in OSEP’s
view, “to allow all parties the opportunity to adequately respond to the impact of
the evidence presented, and to eliminate the element of surprise as a strategy a
party may employ to influence the outcome of the hearing decision.” Letter to
Steinke, 18 IDELR 739 (OSEP 1992); cf. Letter to Bell, 211 IDELR 166 (OSEP
1979) (“It is not interpreted to mean that everything that will be used by either
party must be revealed. It does mean that names of witnesses to be called and the
general thrush of their testimony should be disclosed”). In the commentary
accompanying the most recent IDEA regulations, OSEP added that nothing
prevents parties from agreeing to a shorter period of time. Assistance to States for
the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children
With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at
34 C.F.R. pt. 300). For a decision in which the failure to follow the five-day rule
contributed to a judicial remand to re-do the hearing, see B.G. v. Ocean City Bd. of
Educ., 64 IDELR ¶ 105 (D.N.J. 2014).
183 E.g., Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 1073 (OSEP 1995) (citing 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.512(a)(2)).
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provides such authority,184 the applicable case law is inconclusive.185
88. Do IHOs have the authority to compel the appearance of witness,
including those who are not district employees?
According to OSEP, yes.186
89. May an IHO order the LEA to provide the parent with e-mails
from or to school district personnel?
Presumably this discretion is within the IHO’s subpoena power,187
even though the e-mails may not be student records under FERPA.188
90. Do IHOs have authority to order the district to provide the parent
with access to the records of one or more other students as part of an
impartial hearing?
Not without the consent of the parents of the other students,
according to the Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO), which is

184

E.g., E.D. v. Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala.

2003).
185 Compare Greenwich Bd. of Educ. v. G.M. ex rel. K.M., 66 IDELR ¶ 128
(D. Conn. 2016) (ruling against such IHO authority), and Genn v. New Haven Bd.
of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 73 (D. Conn. 2015) (ruling against IHO authority), and
Walled Lake Consol. Sch. v. Jones ex rel. Thomas, 24 IDELR 738 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (ruling against IHO authority), with Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 480
F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (ruling in favor of such IHO authority), aff’d on
other grounds, 518 F. 3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); cf. Hampton Sch. Dist. v.
Dobrowolski, 17 IDELR 518 (D.N.H. 1991) (at the judicial level) (ruling in favor
of IHO authority where sufficient justification),
186 Letter to Steinke, 28 IDELR 305 (OSEP 1997).
187 In addition to any implied subpoena power of IHOs under the IDEA,
approximately 40 states laws expressly provide IHOs with this power. Zirkel,
supra note 5, at 14–16.
188 Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City Sch. Dist., 739 F. App’x 870 (9th Cir.
2018); S.A. ex rel. L.A. v. Tulare Cty. Office of Educ., 53 IDELR ¶ 111 (E.D. Cal.
2009) (ruling that only those e-mails that not only personally identify the student
but also are in the student’s permanent file qualify as education records under
FERPA); see also E.D. ex rel. T.D. v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 69 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D.
Pa. 2017) (ruling that parent was not entitled to access to e-mails not maintained by
district).

Fall 2018

Impartial Hearings Under the IDEA: Legal Issues and Answers

75

responsible for administering FERPA. For the hearing in question,
which concerned a disciplinary record that included identifiable
information about not only the student with disabilities whose parent
initiated the hearing but also other students, FPCO provided this
guidance:
[A] school district should redact the names of, or
information which would be directly related to, any
other students mentioned in another student's
education records before providing a parent access to
the student's education records. In instances where
joint records cannot be easily redacted or the
information segregated out, the school district may
satisfy a request for access by informing the parent
about the contents of the record which relate to his or
her child.189
Adding support for this answer, a federal district court recently
upheld an IHO’s refusal to allow the parents, via their expert, to
access the records of other students. The court reasoned that even if
the parents had obtained a court order to compel the district to
produce redacted copies, the IHO would not have erred in denying
their request in light of the overriding individualized nature of
FAPE.190
91. Do IHOs have contempt powers?
No, unless state law provides such authority.191
92. Do IHOs have the authority to issue disciplinary sanctions against
a party or the party’s attorney for what the IHO regards as hearing
misconduct?

189
190

Letter to Anonymous, 113 LRP 14615 (FPCO Feb. 13, 2013).
M.A. ex rel. A.A. v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 69 IDELR ¶ 57 (D.N.J.

2016).
191

2003).

E.g., E.D. v. Enterprise City Bd. of Educ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala.
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Again, the answer is a matter of state law, according to OSEP.192
The published case law is scant and somewhat supportive.193
93. May an IHO dismiss a hearing after multiple postponements?
It depends on state law. In a Massachusetts case, the court reversed
such a dismissal where the hearing officer did so after granting the
latest postponement request, but state law required the hearing officer
to either 1) deny the motion for postponement or 2) grant it and set a
new hearing date.194
94. May the school district or its attorney provide the IHO with the
student’s education records without prior consent of the parent?
Yes, according to OSEP, if the parent filed for the hearing.
Conversely, according to OSEP, if the district filed for a hearing, the
school district may do so but only after providing due disclosure to
the parent and via witnesses, not on an ex parte basis..195
95. Does the IDEA entitle the parent to a choice between a written or
electronic (e.g., audio-taped) transcript of the hearing?
Letter to Armstrong, 28 IDELR 303 (OSEP 1997).
E.g., Edward S. ex rel. T.S. v. W. Noble Sch. Corp. 63 IDELR ¶ 34 (N.D.
Ind. 2014) (upholding IHO’s dismissal with prejudice where parents repeatedly
violated IHO’s hearing orders); G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint
Elementary Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 223 (E.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 595 F. App’x 698
(9th Cir. 2014) (upholding IHO’s decision to partially award attorneys’ fees of
$3880 to district for frivolous claim of parent’s attorney); K.S. ex rel. P.S. v.
Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding
IHO’s decision to grant sanctions against parent’s attorney); Stancourt v.
Worthington City Sch. Dist., 841 N.E.2d 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that
IHO has implied powers similar to those of a court but in this case the sanction of
dismissal with prejudice was too harsh); Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696, 32
IDELR ¶ 90 (D. Minn. 2000) (upholding IHO’s order for parent’s attorney to pay
$2,432 as a sanction for filing a frivolous fourth hearing request–based on
Minnesota statute repealed in 2004. For a comprehensive analysis, see Salma A.
Khaleq, The Sanctioning Authority of Hearing Officers in Special Education, 32 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2012).
194 Philbin ex rel. S.P. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 54 IDELR ¶ 96 (D.
Mass. 2010).
195 Letter to Stadler, 24 IDELR 973 (OSEP 1996).
192
193
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Yes. Although the IDEA previously did not offer the parent a
choice,196 the 1997 amendments revised the language to provide
parents with “the right to a written, or, at the option of the parents,
electronic verbatim record of such hearing.”197 The 2004
amendments have retained this choice-providing language.
However, the choice is for one or the other, not both. 198
96. Does this right to a transcript extend to prehearing sessions?
No, according to an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, unless
state law expressly provides otherwise.199
97. Does this right to a transcript continue after the applicable period
for filing for judicial review?
Yes, according to OSEP.200
98. Is the parent entitled to a translation of the hearing transcript into
his or her native language?
Not in the absence of a state law according to a Pennsylvania
appellate court in a gifted education case.201
99. Does the failure to provide the parent with the complete transcript
or recording amount to a denial of FAPE?

E.g., Edward B. v. Paul, 814 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1987).
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(3) (2017).
Thus, the First Circuit’s aforementioned Edward B. decision is no longer good law.
E.g., Stringer v. St. James Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2006).
198
Letter to Maldonado, 49 IDELR ¶ 257 (OSEP 2007),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20073/maldonado091107dueprocess3q2007.pdf.
199 A.L. v. Jackson Cty. Sch. Bd., 635 F. App’x 774 (11th Cir. 2015).
200
Letter to Connelly, 49 IDELR ¶ 135 (OSEP 2007),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20073/connelly081507dueprocess3q2007.pdf.
201 Zhou v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 976 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2009).
196
197
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It depends on whether the missing testimony is significant in terms of
affecting the child’s substantive right to FAPE.202
100. May IHOs take official notice of a fact or standard akin to a
court’s power of judicial notice?
The pertinent case law is insufficient to provide a clear answer where
state law does not expressly provide this power.203
101. May an IHO admit hearsay evidence?
Generally, yes unless state law dictates otherwise,204 but relying on it
in the IHO’s decision without corroborative proof may be
problematic.205
102. May an IHO admit evidence from the period prior to the
applicable statute of limitations?
Yes. This determination is within the IHO’s broad discretion,206
although the results typically only are usable as background
information.207
E.g., Kingsmore v. District of Columbia, 466 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 130 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
203 E.g., J.W. v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting challenge to non-use in connection with applicable state law); Ross v.
Framingham Sch. Comm., 44 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1999), aff’d mem., 229
F.3d 1133 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting challenge to use but not addressing this issue
squarely); cf. Brandon H. v. Kennewick Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (E.D.
Wash. 2000) (citing Washington law specifying said authority).
204 E.g., Jalloh ex rel. R.H. v. District of Columbia, 535 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C.
2008); Sykes v. District of Columbia, 581 F. Supp. 2d 261 (D.D.C. 2007);
Glendale Unified Sch. Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
205 E.g., Speight v. Dep’t of Corrections, 989 A.2d 77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
(ruling in context of administrative hearings generally, rather than IDEA IHO
hearings specifically, in Pennsylvania).
206 E.g., Phyllene W. v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 630 F. App’x 917 (11th
Cir. 2015); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 413 v. H.M.J., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1100 (D. Minn.
2015); cf. Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (listing compliance with the statute
of limitations as one of the examples of the IHO’s broad discretion).
202
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103. Does the “snapshot” rule, or evidentiary standard, apply for
IHO’s assessment of the appropriateness of IEPs?
It depends on the jurisdiction. For example, the First, Second, Third,
and Ninth Circuits have adopted this standard,208 whereas the Fourth
and Tenth Circuits have partially disagreed.209 This approach
considers the time of the educational decision, not the adjudicator’s
deliberations, as controlling to determine appropriateness.
104. On the other hand, what is the “four corners” evidentiary rule in
relation to FAPE determinations?
This standard, which originates in contract law, exclusively restricts
consideration to the final version of the IEP that the school system
offered during the IEP process.210 Various circuits have adopted it
but typically only in limited circumstances or with exceptions.211
105. May the party that requested the hearing generally raise issues
not in the complaint?

E.g., Pangerl v. Peoria Unified Sch. Dist., 67 IDELR ¶ 36 (D. Ariz. 2016);
Haw. Dep’t of Educ. v. E.B. ex rel. J.B., 45 IDELR ¶ 249 (D. Haw. 2006).
208 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); Lessard
v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2008); Adams
v. State of Or., 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999); Fuhrmann v. E. Hanover Bd.
of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993) (Mansmann, J., concurring)
209 E.g., M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315, 326—27
(4th Cir. 2009); O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist., 144 F.3d 692,
702-03 (10th Cir. 1998).
210 E.g., C.G. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2008)
(explaining but not either adopting or rejecting this standard).
211 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); D.S. v.
Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2010); Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist.,
538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008); A.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672
(4th Cir. 2007); Knable v. Bexley City. Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2001);
Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994). For a more recent, state
appellate court decision, see Jenna R.P. v. City of Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 229, 3
N.E.3d 921 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013).
207
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No,212 unless the other either party agrees213 or—at least in the
Second Circuit—“open[s] the door” (e.g., via its opening statement
or via its questioning of witnesses).214 Clarifying that “the waiver
rule is not to be mechanically applied,” the Second Circuit has
explained that “[t]he key … is fair notice and preventing parents
from ‘sandbag[ging] the school district’ by raising claims after the
expiration of the resolution period.”215 In a subsequent decision, a
federal district court in New York concluded that the parent had
provided fair notice of the issue of methodology via a general
reference in the complaint to the lack of sufficient progress in a
similar program.216 Reaching a similar result as the Second Circuit’s
exceptions, the Ninth Circuit found applicable to IDEA hearings the
federal evidentiary rule that treats issues as raised in the complaint if
tried by express or implied consent.217
106. May the complaining party raise additional issues specifically
via a reservation of rights provision in their complaint?

212 E.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2012);
Cty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.
1996). For examples of enforcement of this stricture, see McAllister v. District of
Columbia, 53 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014); T.G. ex rel. R.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 973 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Saki ex rel. Saki v. Haw. Dep’t of
Educ., 50 IDELR ¶ 103 (D. Haw. 2008).
213 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B)
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(d) (2018). For application of this general
requirement to the levels beyond the IHO, see, e.g., R.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Byram
Hills Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
214 M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 250 (2d Cir. 2012); Y.S. v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (via its witnesses and via
cross examination of the other side’s witnesses). This exception is narrowly
limited. E.g., B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 634 F. App’x 845, 849–50 (2d Cir.
2015).
215 A.S. ex rel. Mr. S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d Cir.
2014) (citing C.F. ex rel. R.F. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 746 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir.
2014)).
216 J.W. ex rel. Jake W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 95 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
217 M.C. ex rel. M.N. v. Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1159, 1196
(9th Cir. 2017).
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No, according to a published federal court decision in New York.218
107. May the other (i.e., noncomplaining) party raise issues not in the
complaint?
The regulations do not address this question, but the accompanying
commentary takes the position that the answer is a matter of state
procedures and, in their absence, the IHO’s discretion.219
108. Does an IHO have authority to proceed with the hearing in the
of a party?
In general, courts review such matters on an abuse of discretion
standard, which makes it advisable for the IHO to provide and
document due notice to the non-appearing party and ample
opportunity for rescheduling participation. Thus, it would appear to
be in effect a last resort within the need for a prompt decision. In
applying these limited circumstances, courts have upheld the IHO in
the clear majority of cases. 220
109. May an IHO order the independent evaluation of the child? If
so, who is responsible for payment of the evaluator, and are there any
limits to the cost and qualifications?
The IDEA regulations make clear that if the IHO orders the
evaluation it is at public expense (i.e., the district is responsible for

B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 841 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and
Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,706 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also Letter to Cohen, supra note
22.
220 Compare J.D. ex rel. Davis v. Kanawha Cty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. A. No.
2:09-cv-00139, 2009 WL 4730804 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 4, 2009), aff’d mem., 357 F.
App’x 515 (4th Cir. 2009); A.S. v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶ 62 (E.D.
Pa. 2014); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 794
(N.D. Ohio 2009); cf. Doe v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dep’t, 89 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 2006)
(upholding dismissal via exhaustion analysis); Cty. of Tolumne v. Special Educ.
Hearing Office, No. F046485, 2006 WL 165045 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2006), with
Millay ex rel. YRM v. Surry Sch. Dep't, 707 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D. Me. 2010).
218
219
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payment).221 The courts have recognized that this regulation provides
the underlying authority for such an order,222 including its use for
providing an expert assessment for determining a compensatory
education award per the qualitative approach.223 The cost and
qualifications limits are those that apply to the district’s use of
evaluators.224 However, an order for a trial period as the evaluation
poses other limits,225 and the issue of an IEE at public expense is also
distinguishable.226
110. Does the school system have the legal right to object to the
parent’s choice to have the hearing open or closed to the public?
Not according to OSEP.227

OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.502(d) (2018).
222 E.g., B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792 (D.C. Cir. 2016); LopezYoung v. District of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 42 (D.D.C. 2016).
223 E.g., Luo v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 68 IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016);
Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 169 (E.D. Pa. 2010); ManchesterEssex Reg'l Sch. Dist. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 490 F. Supp. 2d
49, 54 (D. Mass. 2007). Indeed, it is reversible error for an IHO not to issue such
an order in certain circumstances. E.g., M.Z. ex rel. D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 521 F. App'x 74, 77 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling that the IHO erred by not ordering
an IEE at public expense upon finding the district’s evaluation to be inappropriate).
224 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(e). Limitations of an evaluator’s implementation of
the IHO’s order is a separable issue. E.g., Luo v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 68
IDELR ¶ 245 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (recognizing a constitutional privacy claim upon
private psychologist’s access to student’s records in the absence of parental
consent).
225 E.g., Manchester-Essex Reg'l Sch. Dist. Comm. v. Bureau of Special Educ.
Appeals, 490 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (D. Mass. 2007). Indeed, it is reversible error for
an IHO not to issue such an order in certain circumstances.
226 E.g., M.Z., 521 F. App'x at 77 (ruling that the IHO erred by not ordering an
IEE at public expense upon finding the district’s evaluation to be inappropriate);
Lyons v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 56 IDELR ¶ 169 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (ruling that
the regulation authorizing an IHO to order an IEE “‘as part of’ a larger process”
does not deprive an IHO of jurisdiction of a request for an IEE at public expense).
227
Letter
to
Eig,
68
IDELR
¶
109
(OSEP
2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-fg-8-0416.pdf.
221
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111. What is the outer boundary of a parent’s right in terms of having
individuals, including members of the press, attend hearing that they
have chosen to be closed?
According to OSEP, the outer limit is for “individuals who have
some direct relationship to the parties and/or a personal need to
understand the conduct of proceedings generally,” thus not extending
to members of the press.228 OSEP also added the reminder that an
IHO may “remove any individual in attendance whose behavior is
disruptive or otherwise interferes with conducting a fair and impartial
hearing.”229
112. Do school employees, whom the parent has not invited, have the
right to attend a closed hearing?
No, according to OSEP, unless (1) the parents have provided consent,
(2) the IDEA regulations authorize their attendance, or they meet the
FERPA exception for “legitimate educational interests.”230 OSEP
also emphasized that in such matters, the IHO “is in the best position
to ensure that the confidentiality of personally identifiable
information is properly protected and that standard legal practice is
followed in the due process hearing.”231
113. Is opposing counsel entitled to a copy of an expert’s notes for
cross-examination if the expert uses the notes on direct examination?
Yes, according to an unpublished decision in New Hampshire, but
the court relied in part on the state-adopted Federal rules of
Evidence.232

228

Id.
Id.
230 Letter to Reisman, 60 IDELR ¶ 293 (OSEP 2012) (citing 34 C.F.R. §
99.31(a)(1)),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/12015702r-pa-gran-dph-11-30-12.pdf.
231 Id.
232 I.D. ex rel. W.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 17 IDELR 684 (D.N.H.
1991).
229
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114. Does attorney-client privilege apply to lay advocates in
impartial hearings under the IDEA?
It depends on state law. For example, a federal magistrate concluded
that New Jersey law implied an affirmative answer for impartial
hearings under the IDEA.233
115. In a compensatory education or tuition reimbursement case,
does the IHO have the discretionary authority to bifurcate the hearing
so that the remedial issue is reserved for a second stage depending on
the outcome of the FAPE issue?
This matter is largely unsettled. With very limited exception,234 state
laws do not address this question. Similarly, the directly applicable
case law provides qualified but limited support.235 Arguably, this
procedure, if exercised prudently, fulfills the IDEA purpose of
efficient hearings. Moreover, if the parties agree to the procedure
and cooperate in its prompt completion, its practical utility and legal
defensibility would seem to be high.
116. May an IHO (a) rely in part on unsworn statements of a party
during the prehearing conference and (b) consider sworn testimony
of the parent showing a bias for parochial schools?
According to a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the
answers are (a) yes, and (b) maybe. More specifically, the court
respectively (a) rejected the application of the Federal Rules of
Evidence regarding settlement and other such statements, and (b)

Woods ex rel. T.W. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51 (D.N.J. 1993).
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76h-14(b) (authorizing IHOs to bifurcate the
hearing in tuition reimbursement cases); cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:1-14.6(e)
(providing more general and qualified authority for HO bifurcation of the hearing).
235 L.J. v. Fair Lawn Bd. of Educ., 486 F. App’x 967 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding
the IHO’s bifurcation of the hearing in a tuition reimbursement case based on state
law as applied to the particular circumstances); Maple Heights City Sch. Dist. v.
A.C. ex rel. A.W., 68 IDELR ¶ 5 (N.D. Ohio 2016) (concluding that the IHO
implicitly has bifurcation authority in a compensatory education case and any delay
affects both parties equally).
233
234
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concluded that this considered preference was relevant to the FAPE
issue but not the ultimate foundation for the IHO’s decision.236
G. Decisional Issues
117. What is the role of medical, psychological, and educational
diagnoses that are not listed in the IDEA classifications for
eligibility?
Such diagnoses may provide a supplementary role, but they are not
generally necessary; in cases of conflict in definitions or criteria, the
IDEA specifications are controlling.237
118. Is the “educational performance” component of the eligibility
definition limited to the academic, as compared with the social,
dimension?
The two major appellate decisions are split on this interpretational
issue.238
119. Are any of the procedural violations of the IDEA a per se denial
of FAPE?
The only seeming possibility, depending on the interpretation of the
relevant IDEA language, is where the proof is preponderant that the
district “[s]ignificantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to

Johnson v. Boston Pub. Sch., 906 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 2018). This questionand-answer item overlaps with the Impartiality and Decisional Issues sections of
this document.
237 E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Role of the DSM in IDEA Case Law, 39
COMMUNIQUÉ 30 (Jan. 2011). For illustrative policy interpretations specific to
dyslexia, see, for example, Letter to Unnerstall, 68 IDELR ¶ 22 (OSEP 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/oseplettertounnerstall425-16dyslexia.pdf; Dear Colleague Letter, 66 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSERS 2015).
238 Compare C.B. ex rel. Z.G. v. Dep’t of Educ., 322 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir.
2009) (academic only), with Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2007) (extends to social dimension).
236

86

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

38-2

participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of
a FAPE to the parent’s child.”239
120. Has the Rowley floor-based substantive standard for denial of
FAPE changed?
Yes.240
121. What is the prevailing standard for FAPE implementation cases?
Rather than 100% compliance, the leading judicial standards are (1)
failure to implement a material, i.e., substantial or significant, portion
of the IEP, and (2) the same material failure plus the lack of
benefit.241
122. Do an IHO’s minor corrections of the transcript constitute per se
reversible error with respect to his or her decision?
No.242
123. Would the verbatim adoption of all of either party’s proposed
findings of facts undermine the traditional deference to the IHO’s
findings and presumption of impartiality?
It certainly could do so.243
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)
(2017); OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with
Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2018).
240 In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017), the Supreme Court held, based on the confined facts and conclusions in
Rowley, that the substantive standard is whether the IEP “is reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress in light of the child’s circumstances.”
241 Compare Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811
(9th Cir. 2007) (materiality alone), with Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200
F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000) (materiality/benefit). For a detailed analysis, see Perry A.
Zirkel & Edward T. Bauer, The Third Dimension of FAPE under the IDEA: IEP
Implementation, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 409 (2016).
242 E.g., Paschl v. Sch. Bd., 453 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2008) (ruling that IHO’s
corrections to the transcript were, if error, harmless).
243 E.g., Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 39 IDELR ¶ 66 (D. Minn. 2004).
239
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124. Who has the burden of persuasion at the hearing stage?
For FAPE cases, the Supreme Court held that under the IDEA, which
is silent on this point, the burden of persuasion is on the challenging
party, i.e., the parent.244 However, some state laws have put the
burden of proof in such cases on the district.245 Conversely, lower
courts have extended the Supreme Court’s ruling to other issues, such
as whether the child is eligible246 and whether the child’s placement
is in the least restrictive environment (LRE).247
125. What is the standard, or quantum, of proof at the hearing stage?
Presumably it is the general civil standard of preponderance of the
evidence, as derived from the judicial review stage.248
126. Does an IHO have authority to grant res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect to a previous IHO decision?
Yes.249
127. Does an IHO’s FAPE or placement decision for one academic
year have a binding effect, via res judicata or collateral estoppel, on
FAPE or placement for the next academic year?
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1)(c). The limited exception in New York is for
the second step in tuition reimbursement cases, which is whether the parent’s
unilateral placement is appropriate. Id. Other state laws put the burden of
production in FAPE cases on the district without making clear the possible
distinction from the burden of persuasion. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-8.02a(g-55)
(2018).
246 Antoine M. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., 420 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
247 L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2006).
248 OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3) (2018).
249 E.g., Lillbask ex rel. Mauclaire v. Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 397 F.3d 77 (2d
Cir. 2005); Horen v. Bd. of Educ. of Toledo Pub. Sch. Dist., 950 F. Supp. 2d 946
(N.D. Ohio 2013); IDEA Pub. Charter Sch. v. Belton ex rel. C.M., 48 IDELR ¶ 90
(D.D.C. 2007).
244
245
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No, according to the Ninth Circuit; each school year represents a
separate issue.250
128. May an IHO remand a case to the district for further action or
information rather than deciding the case?
No, such action would violate the IDEA’s imperative for a timely
final decision.251
H. Written Decisions
129. Does the IHO have the discretion to restate the issue(s) of the
case?
Yes, within reasonable limits, based on the IHO’s consideration of
the parties’ arguments.252
130. May IHOs comment in the written decision about attorney
conduct at the hearing?
OSEP has indirectly addressed this issue by opining that a state law
that expressly allows such comments is not contrary to the IDEA
provided that the comment is 1) linked to a relevant issue (e.g., a
250 T.G. ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baldwin Park Unified Sch. Dist., 443 F. App’x
273, 276 (9th Cir. 2011).
251 E.g., Muth ex rel. Muth v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 124–25
(3d Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
252 E.g., M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014); J.W. v.
Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Ford v. Long Beach
Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2002); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 58
IDELR ¶ 132 (N.D. Cal. 2012); K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 54
IDELR ¶ 215 (D. Minn. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 747 F.3d 795 (8th Cir.
2011); W.H. ex rel. B.H. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 52 IDELR ¶ 258 (E.D. Cal.
2009); cf. Adam Wayne D. v. Beechwood Indep. Sch. Dist., 482 F. App’x 52 (6th
Cir. 2012) (implicit notice to defendant-district); Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch.
Dist., 328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003) (impartiality challenge); Renollett v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 11, 42 IDELR ¶ 201 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 440
F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (limiting the issues). But cf. M.C. ex rel. M.N. v.
Antelope Union High Sch. Dist., 852 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2017) (questioning wisdom
of IHO reframing issues where the complainant has legal representation).
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complaint perceived to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation) and 2) does not preclude a party’s ability to address such
comments in court or in any application for attorneys’
fees.253
131. Do the IHO’s legal findings need support in the record?
Yes; without such support, a court may conclude that the findings
were arbitrary and capricious.254 Conversely, where the IHO’s legal
findings are supported in the record, courts generally afford them
notable deference.255 In general, the deference increases where the
IHO’s factual findings are careful and thorough.256 Moreover, given
Letter to Zimberlin, supra note 104.
E.g., J.G. ex rel. Jimenez v. Baldwin Park Unified Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp.
3d 1268 (C.D. Cal. 2015); M.O. v. District of Columbia, 20 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C.
2013); S.G. v. District of Columbia, 498 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D.D.C. 2007); cf. Haw.
Dep’t of Educ. v. Ria L. ex rel. Rita L., 64 IDELR ¶ 236 (D. Haw. 2014) (remand
for failure to explain credibility findings); J.M. ex rel. L.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (where extensive attention to facts not
directly related to the core issue of the case and contradictory findings on this
issue); R.C. ex rel. X.C. v. Great Meadows Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 61
(D.N.J. 2013) (in the absence of an evidentiary hearing); Stanton v. District of
Columbia, 680 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2010) (failure to include sufficient
findings and reasoning for calculation of compensatory education); Options Pub.
Charter Sch. v. Howe, 512 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2007) (entire lack of factual
findings nullified IHO’s decision). But cf. J.P. v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 254 (4th
Cir. 2008) (credibility-based determinations need not be detailed in light of the
forty-five-day deadline); see also B.E.L. v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 63 F.
Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Haw. 2014); S.A. v. Weast, 898 F. Supp. 2d 869 (D. Md. 2012).
255 E.g., Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 2010); D.B. ex
rel. Brinson v. Craven Cty. Bd. of Educ., 32 IDELR ¶ 86 (4th Cir. 2000); Doyle v.
Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991); cf. Carlisle Area Sch. Dist.
v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 1995) (credibility-based factual findings).
However, the Seventh Circuit has made an ambiguous distinction between the
“evidence” and IHO’s “decision.” Heather S. v. Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th
Cir. 1995).
256 E.g., Pointe Educ. Serv. v. A.T., 610 F. App’x 702 (9th Cir. 2015); J.W. v.
Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2010); Cerra v. Pawling Cent.
Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2005); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Wartenburg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995); Doyle v. Arlington Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d
100 (4th Cir. 1991); Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Sch., 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2010).
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has counted the IHO’s participation in the
253
254
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the grey area of mixed questions of fact and law, the boundary
between factual findings and legal conclusions under the IDEA does
not amount to a bright line. For example, in the Fourth Circuit at
least, the appropriateness of an IEP is a question of fact.257
132. Does the IHO have to limit the factual findings in the written
decision to those essential for the legal conclusions?
Although it may be appropriate practice, as a matter of efficiency, to
do so, there is no such legal requirement; i.e., it is not reversible error
to include additional facts.258
133. Do IHOs have similar qualified discretion with regard to their
legal conclusions?
Yes. For example, writing shortcuts, such as cutting and pasting a
selected group of conclusions from another decision, are not legal
error if well founded.259 Conversely, however, an IHO’s legal
conclusion that fails to reference the supporting facts may not receive
judicial deference.260 For example, a federal court vacated and
remanded a hearing officer’s decision that “lack[ed] sufficiently
detailed reasoning” (which in this case overlapped with insufficiently
explained fact-finding).261
questioning of witnesses as part, although not necessarily the controlling part, of
the “thorough and careful” calculus for according deference. R.B. v. Napa Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007); Park v. Anaheim High Sch.
Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006). Conversely, a court exhibited
disappointment and aversion to a case where the hearing officer adopted verbatim
the 480 factual findings and 79 legal conclusions proposed by one of the parties.
B.H. ex rel. T.H. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., 65 IDELR ¶ 66 (E.D.N.C. 2015).
257 E.g., G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2003).
258 E.g., B.E.L. v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D. Haw.
2014).
259 Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR ¶ 249
(E.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 391 F. App’x 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
260 E.g., Marc M. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.
Haw. 2011).
261 M.O. v. District of Columbia, 20 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2013); see also
T.S. v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 69 IDELR ¶ 95 (E.D. Mich. 2017); J.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., 62 IDELR ¶ 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (unduly short analysis of the case
issues).
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134. Is it appropriate for an IHO to use the term “mental retardation”
in a written decision referring to a child with this classification?
No. On October 5, 2010, the President Obama signed legislation that
changes the use of “mental retardation” in the IDEA and other
federal legislation and regulations to “intellectual disability.”262
135. Do IHO remedial orders need to have a specific evidentiary
foundation?
Yes, but the reversals on this basis are relatively infrequent and more
a matter of the underlying substance than the quality of the writing.263
136. Are IHOs allowed to amend their decisions for technical errors?
Yes, to the extent that OSEP leaves the matter to the discretion of
SEAs and IHOs, provided that both parties receive proper notice.264
Such corrections may be either sua sponte or, when it does not
change the substance or outcome of the decision, at the request of
either party.265
137. Must IHOs redact their written decisions to avoid information
that is not personally identifiable to the student(s)?

Rosa’s Law, 124 STAT. 2643 (2010).
E.g., Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 67 IDELR ¶ 139 (E.D. Mich. 2016)
(viewing IHO’s denial of compensatory education as not entitled to deference due
to lack of explanation and justification); L.O. v. E. Allen Cty. Sch. Corp., 58 F.
Supp. 3d 882 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (invalidating various IHO orders in the absence of
sufficient factual foundation or legal violations); District of Columbia v. Pearson,
923 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling that any FAPE-related remedial relief
requires not only ruling that district denied FAPE but also reasonably specific
evidentiary basis); cf. Cupertino Union Sch. Dist. v. K.A., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1088
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (vacating and remanding IHO compensatory education award for
lack of evidentiary support).
264 Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and the
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
265 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-25.
262
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This issue is reserved to state law and policy, but OSEP has clarified
that the SEA is ultimately responsible for redacting, before public
dissemination of the decision, “any personal characteristics or other
information that would make it possible to identify the student who is
the subject of the written decision with reasonable certainty or make
the student’s identity easily traceable.”266 This redaction does not
extend to the IHO’s name, the district’s name, or the case number
unless it would result in personally identifiable information to the
student(s).267
I. Miscellaneous
138. Does a noncustodial parent have standing to file for a due
process hearing?
Yes, according to the Seventh Circuit, unless (a) unless the divorce
decree expressly eliminates all rights in educational matters or (b) the
custodial parent’s exercise of the decreed rights trumps this right.268
139. What is the standard of judicial review for an IHO’s decision?
The lower courts have varied in their interpretation and application of
the Supreme Court’s “due weight”269 standard.270 However, the
Letter to Anderson, 48 IDELR ¶ 105 (OSEP 2006),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20064/anderson101306confident4q2006.pdf.
267
Letter to Anonymous, 67 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSEP 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/16-000584iepdevelopmentandimplementation-acc.pdf.
268 Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2001), after
remand, 49 F. App’x 69 (7th Cir. 2003).
269 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206 (1982).
270 See generally Perry A. Zirkel & Cathy Skidmore, Judicial Appeal of Due
Process Rulings, 29 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 22 (2018); Perry A. Zirkel,
Judicial Appeals of Hearing/Review Officer Decisions under the IDEA, 78
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 375 (2012); James Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis
of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469
(1999); cf. Perry A. Zirkel, The Standard of Review Applicable to Pennsylvania’s
Special Education Appeals Panel, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 871 (1994) (proposing the
analogous standard for IDEA review officers).
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general theme is to provide (1) presumptive deference to the IHO’s
factual findings, particularly for the credibility of witnesses, and (2)
de novo review for the IHO’s legal conclusions.271 The deference for
factual findings tends to be less for those that are based on additional
evidence272 and more for those that are careful and thorough.273
Overall, the party challenging an IHO’s decision faces a steep “uphill
climb.”274
140. Does an IHO have authority to confer consent decree status on a
settlement agreement?
The likely answer is “in limited circumstances,” although the case
law is not sufficiently on point for a more definitive answer. More
specifically, the court decisions concerning whether the parent is
entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party of a consent decree
are indirectly applicable and have varying limits.275
141. May lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings?

E.g., Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 200 (3d Cir.
2004); Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th
Cir. 2001); Doyle v. Arlington Cty. Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1991).
272 E.g., Alex R., ex rel. Beth R. v. Forrestville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d
603, 612 (7th Cir. 2004).
273 E.g., Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th
Cir. 1995). See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit recently clarified that this deference does not apply for a lengthy IHO
decision that failed to address all the issues and evidence. M.C. ex rel. M.N. v.
Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 2017).
274 E.g., James S. ex rel. J.S. v. Town of Lincoln, 59 IDELR ¶ 191 (D.R.I.
2012). For an empirical analysis that shows the high correlation in outcomes upon
judicial review, see Zirkel & Skidmore, Judicial Appeal of Due Process Rulings,
supra note 270.
275 E.g., Justin R. v. Matayoshi, 561 F. App’x 619, 620 (9th Cir. 2014);
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F.3d 622,
626-31 (4th Cir. 2010); Maria C. ex rel. Camacho v. Sch. Dist., 142 F. App’x 78,
81–82 (3d Cir. 2005); V.G. v. Auburn Enlarged Cent. Sch. Dist., 349 F. App’x 582,
584 (2d Cir. 2009).
271
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It depends primarily on state law. During the most recent survey, 10
states prohibited their representation, and 12 permitted it.276 In other
states, the decision is within the IHO’s discretion, with some IHOs
not allowing it as the unauthorized practice of law.277
142. When lay advocates represent parents at due process hearings,
are their communications privileged at subsequent judicial
proceedings to the same extent as under the attorney-client privilege?
Yes, according to a published federal magistrate’s decision in New
Jersey.278
143. May an IHO reconsider a decision upon the request of either
party or both parties?
Only if (1) the state’s applicable procedures allow it, and (2) the
reconsideration is before the final decision and is issued within the
forty-five-day, or properly extended timeline.279
144. May an IHO clarify the decision upon the request of either or
both parties?
Only if the state procedures allow it and within a limited time.280
Perry A. Zirkel, Lay Advocates and Parent Experts under the IDEA, 217
EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21 (2007).
277 Id. at 22–24. But cf. Kay Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the Matter of Arons:
Construction of the IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow?, 9 GEORGETOWN
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193 (2002) (criticizing the Delaware decision, which
ruled that the lay advocate who represented the parents had engaged in
unauthorized practice of law).
278 Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 858 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.N.J. 1993). The
court did not definitively rule on the related question of work-product protection,
although seeming to lean in the same direction for that answer. Id.
279 C.C. v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 IDELR ¶ 109 (E.D. Tex. 2015);
Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-25; Letter to Colleye, 111
LRP
45430
(OSEP
Oct.
20,
2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/20104/colleye102010dph4q2010.pdf; Letter to Weiner, 57 IDELR ¶ 79 (OSEP 2011).
For the similar but separable issue of whether the state may clarify the IHO’s order
via CRP, see Gumm ex rel. Gumm v. Nev. Dep’t of Educ., 113 P.3d 853, 858
(Nev. 2005).
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145. Does an IHO have the authority to retain jurisdiction sua
sponte?
No, according to the limited case law due to the finality requirement
for IHO decisions.281
146. Do parents have the right to place under seal the transcript and
exhibits of an open due process hearing for which the redacted IHO
decision is available on the SEA website?
Yes, according to an unpublished decision in Ohio, in which the
court relied on FERPA and the child’s right to privacy.282
147. Does the IDEA permit interlocutory appeals of IHO prehearing
orders or interim rulings (e.g., partial dismissal) to court?
No, according to various courts.283
148. In a tuition reimbursement case, does the IDEA require payment
during the stay-put period?

E.g., T.G. ex rel. T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931–32
(C.D. Ill. 2012); see also Assistance to States for the Education of Children With
Disabilities and the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with
Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406, 12,613 (Mar. 12, 1999) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 300). For a review officer decision that vacated an IHO’s clarified
decision as not meeting these criteria, see In re Student with a Disability, No. 17021, 117 LRP 25324 (N.Y. SEA May 22, 2017).
281 E.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. ex rel. J.D., 948 F. Supp. 860, 889–
90 (D. Minn. 1995).
282 Oakstone Cmty. Sch. v. Williams, 58 IDELR ¶ 256 (S.D. Ohio 2012), rev’d
on other grounds, 615 F. App’x 284 (6th Cir. 2015).
283 J.G. ex rel. Greenberg v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 728 F. App’x 764, 765 (9th
Cir. 2018); M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1088–90 (9th Cir. 2012);
Hopewell Valley Reg’l Bd. of Educ. v. J.R. ex rel. S.R., 67 IDELR ¶ 202 (D.N.J.
2016); I.K. ex rel. B.K. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 674, 688
(E.D. Pa. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 567 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014). Stayput is a possible exception. E.g., Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P., 582 F.3d 576,
592 (5th Cir. 2009).
280
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Not necessarily, according to OSEP. It is a state law matter, subject
to IHO and court interpretation.284 However, various courts have
interpreted stay-put to apply to an IHO’s—or, in a two-tier state, a
review officer’s—decision that orders tuition reimbursement.285
149. May a school district delay implementing an IHO’s remedial
order in favor of the parent prior to expiration of the period for
appeal?
It depends, according to OSEP. The threshold criteria are whether (1)
state law allows it, and (2) the state’s appeal period is reasonable.286
However, the ultimate criterion is what is a “reasonable period of
time” in the particular case, which is a factual matter based on
various factors that include the timing of the district’s appeal and the
nature of the IHO-ordered relief.287
150. Do IHOs have authority to enter a contingent final order?
Yes, in limited circumstances, according to a federal district court
case.288 As the second step of its analysis, the court concluded that
the IHO did not abuse her discretion in conditionally dismissing the
parent’s case with prejudice if she did not file a new complaint within
thirty days.289
151. Do IHOs have a constitutional right to a hearing upon their
termination?

Letter to Philpot, 60 IDELR ¶ 140 (OSEP 2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/11-007614r-tx-philpottxrules-11-7-2012.pdf.
285 E.g., Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 F.3d
1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009); Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 290
F.3d 476, 487 (2d Cir. 2002); St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d
776, 789–91 (5th Cir. 1998); Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S. ex rel. Heidi S., 96
F.3d 78, 83–85 (3d Cir. 1996).
286 Letter to Anonymous, 29 IDELR 179 (OSEP 1993).
287 Letter to Voigt, supra note 96.
288 Silva v. District of Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 62, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2014).
289 Id.
284
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No, according to the limited case law authority where the IHO
received notice of the findings and an opportunity to reply in writing
under the applicable state law.290
152. Is an IHO’s prehearing order appealable to court?
No, according to the Ninth Circuit.291 The court reasoned that the
principles underlying the "final judgment rule"—the promotion of
judicial efficiency and the avoidance of multiple lawsuits—also
applied to reviews of IHO decisions under the IDEA.292
153. Do the two specifically authorized IHO remedies for
disciplinary changes in placement at 34 C.F.R. § 300.432(b)(2)
preclude additional or alternative remedies in such cases?
No, according to OSEP.293 In some of these expedited cases, OSEP
offered compensatory education as an example of a permissible
remedy.294
154. Does an IHO have authority to order a district to comply with a
violated procedural requirement even if the violation does not
amount to a denial of FAPE?
Yes, just as long the order is limited to ordering prospective
procedural compliance.295
155. To resolve the issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel, may a
SEA assign a case to the same IHO who adjudicated a prior case with
the same parties?

290

Tyk v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 796 N.Y.S.2d 405, 428–29 (App. Div.

2005).
M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d at 1088–90.
Id.
293 Letter to Zirkel, 119 LRP 19543 (OSEP May 13, 2019).
294 Id.
295 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(iii)
(2017). See, e.g., Dawn G. ex rel. D.B. v. Mabank Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 IDELR ¶
63 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
291
292
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Yes, according to OSEP.296
156. Must the SEA make IHO decisions available to the public? If
so, for how long?
Yes.297 OSEP has added that this availability should be FERPArequired redaction.298 The agency clarified that the required
redaction includes information that (a) would make the student
identifiable with reasonable certainty, or (b) would “make the
student’s identity easily traceable if disclosed to the school’s
community or the community at large.”299
For the period, OSEP stated: “We view [a] five and a half year[] time
period as the most reasonable minimum time period during which
States must make due process and State-level review findings and
decisions available to the public under [the IDEA regulations].”300
157. After a parent files a complaint for investigation under the
SEA’s complaint procedures process, may a district file for a due
process hearing on the same issue(s) so as to trigger the IDEA
regulations’ mandatory deferral?
Yes, although OSEP strongly encouraged districts not to do so,
instead recommending mediation or other informal dispute resolution
procedures.301 OSEP’s rationale was as follows:

Letter to McDowell, 213 IDELR 162 (OSEP 1988).
OSERS Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.513(d)(2), 300.514(c)(2) (2018).
298 Dispute Resolution Procedures, supra note 17, at item C-27.
299
Letter to Anonymous, 67 IDELR ¶ 188 (OSEP 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/16-000584iepdevelopmentandimplementation-acc.pdf.
300 Letter to Anonymous, 69 IDELR ¶ 253 (OSEP 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/
policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/osep-letter-to-anonymous-2-27-17recordretention.pdf.
301
Dear Colleague Letter, 65 IDELR ¶ 151 (OSEP 2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/dcl04152015disputeres
olution2q2015.pdf.
296
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Public agencies that seek to force parents who have already
exercised their right to file a State complaint into a potentially
more adversarial due process hearing harm the "cooperative
process" that should be the goal of all stakeholders.
Moreover, diverting resources into adversarial processes
between parents and public agencies is contrary to
Congressional intent in the 2004 amendments to IDEA's
dispute resolution procedures to give parents and schools
expanded opportunities to resolve their disagreements in
positive and constructive ways.302
158. What should the IHO do if the parents file for a hearing after
closure of the charter school that their child attended?
First, the answer depends on the status of the charter school under
state law, with the two primary but not exclusive categories being the
charter school as a LEA or being part of an LEA.303 If the charter
school is part of an LEA, the LEA is the proper party (unless state
law assigns responsibility to another public entity).304 However, if
the school is an LEA, the SEA would appear to have the ultimate
obligation in the matter,305 and the IHO’s actions will depend on
whether the parents file against the SEA as an additional or
alternative party.306 If not, the IHO faces the difficulty of a charter
school defendant who may not appear or, upon appearing, may claim
insolvency.307
159. Do IHOs have the authority to award attorneys’ fees?

302

Id.
Frequently Asked Questions about the Rights of Students with Disabilities
in Public Charter Schools under the IDEA, 69 IDELR ¶ 78 (OSERS 2016), at item
6.
304 Id. at items 7 and 49.
305 Id. at item 9. See, e.g., Charlene R. v. Solomon Charter Sch., 63 F. Supp.
3d 510, 519–20 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
306 E.g., Rodriguez v. Creative Educ. Preparatory Inst., No. DPH 1516-28, 117
LRP 4367 (N.M. SEA Jan. 12, 2017).
307 E.g., Mr. B. v. E. Granby Bd. of Educ., 201 F. App’x 834, 837 (2d Cir.
2006); Mathern v. Campbell Cty. Children’s Ctr., 674 F. Supp. 816, 818 (D. Wyo.
1987).
303
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No. Neither the IDEA nor any corollary state law provides for this
authority, although two states require IHOs to designate the
prevailing party on an issue-by-issue basis.308 In the absence of the
requisite statutory basis, IHOs lack this authority.309
160. Is there any case law about the employment security of IHOs?
The case law is limited, and the expectation of continued
employment varies widely per individual contract arrangements and
applicable state law.310

Zirkel, supra note 5, at 14–16 (identifying California and Tennessee as the
only states with this requirement).
309 E.g., Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty. v. C.B., 315 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1319 (S.D.
Fla. 2018); A.L. v. Jackson Cty. Sch. Bd., 127 So. 3d 758, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
310 E.g., Stengle v. Office of Dispute Resolution, 631 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577–84
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting First Amendment, Rehabilitation Act, and state
whistleblower law claims of IHO whose nonrenewal was based on her blog of
IDEA advocacy); Tyk v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 796 N.Y.S.2d 406–07 (upholding
revocation of IHO’s certification based on “misconduct or incompetence,”
including failing to issue a decision in a timely manner, according to statutory due
process, which included an opportunity to respond in writing to the notice of
proposed revocation).
308

